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Ebola Does Not Fall from the Sky: 




 This Article challenges the conventional understanding that 
international crises are limited to instances of direct physical vi-
olence. Instead, it argues that the disproportionate distribution 
of infectious diseases like Ebola is a form of structural violence 
that warrants international intervention. In the field of global 
public health, structural violence is a concept used to describe 
health inequities and to draw attention to the differential risks 
for infection in the Global South, and among those already in-
fected, for adverse consequences including death, injury, and ill-
ness. This Article clarifies how the concept of structural violence 
can be operationalized in law. It illustrates the ways in which 
actors can facilitate conditions for structural violence by analyz-
ing the international public health and peace and security re-
gimes.  
 This Article has several important contributions. First, the 
way international actors conceptualize crises should be expanded 
beyond merely addressing direct physical violence, but to also in-
clude remedying structural violence. Additionally, this study in-
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dicates that the complicated relationship between infectious dis-
eases and conflict deserves more robust attention and resources. 
Moreover, this study examines the limits of the law governing in-
ternational responsibility and concludes that shared interna-
tional responsibility norms should be developed to assist in ex-
panding the tools available for the protection of human rights. 
Lastly, this Article finds that the burgeoning field of interna-
tional disaster law holds promise for responding to the challenges 
posed by infectious diseases like Ebola and the alleviation of 
large-scale human suffering caused by such diseases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Today, infectious diseases cause approximately 25 percent of all 
deaths around the world,1 and over thirty infectious diseases have 
emerged during the last twenty years.2 Due to the increasing intercon-
nectedness of the world, the need for effective international regulation 
of highly infectious diseases cannot be overstated, especially for devel-
oping countries in the Global South.3 As Jim Yong Kim, President of 
the World Bank (WB), remarked, the “Ebola crisis in Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone taught all of us that we must be much more vigilant 
to outbreaks and respond immediately to save lives and also to protect 
economic growth.”4 Indeed, recent economic studies indicate that the 
annual cost of moderate to severe pandemics globally is roughly USD 
570 billion.5 Moreover, threats to global public health pose significant 
challenges for human security,6 which underscores the need for effec-
tive international regulation of pandemics.   
                                                                                                                       
1 Nicholas Israel Nii-Trebi, Emerging and Neglected Infectious Diseases: Insights, 
Advances, and Challenges, BIOMED RES. INT’L, 2017, at 3; see generally Haidong Wang 
et al., Global, Regional, and National Life Expectancy, All-cause Mortality, and Cause-
specific Mortality for 249 Causes of Death, 1980–2015: A Systematic Analysis for the 
Global Burden of Disease Study 2015, 388 THE LANCET 1459 (2016). 
2 Nii-Trebi, supra note 1, at 1; Lawrence O. Gostin, Why Rich Countries Should Care 
About the World’s Least Healthy People, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 89, 90 (2007). 
3 This Article uses the terms “Global North” and “Global South” as devices to describe 
divisions that exist between the generally developed North and the generally less devel-
oped South, but these characterizations overly simplify and paper over wide disparities 
and diversity that exist in each category. 
4 Press Release, World Bank Group Launches Groundbreaking Financing Facility to 
Protect Poorest Countries against Pandemics, World Bank Press Release No. 
2016/HDN/383 (May 21, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-re-
lease/2016/05/21/world-bank-group-launches-groundbreaking-financing-facility-to-pro-
tect-poorest-countries-against-pandemics [https://perma.cc/C4MS-T75P] (archived Jan. 
29, 2018). The WB’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility will create the world’s first 
insurance market for pandemic risk. Id.  
5 Id. 
6 The concept of “human security” was first popularized by the United Nations Develop-
ment Program in the early 1990s. Human security, like structural violence moves away 
from conventional understandings of violence that are rooted primarily in military ag-
gression vis-à-vis other states, to one that focuses on the security of the individual. See 
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 The Ebola epidemic laid bare the weakness of global mechanisms 
to respond adequately to public health crises. Ebola is an infectious 
disease that manifests as a severe hemorrhagic fever, which is often 
fatal without proper clinical care, such as providing fluids and main-
taining blood pressure and oxygen levels. Because the early symptoms 
resemble common diseases like malaria, many do not realize they are 
infected and do not seek treatment at a hospital. The virus is spread in 
humans through direct contact with broken skin, blood, bodily fluids, 
or contaminated objects, and possibly through sexual contact.7 Be-
tween 2014 and 2015, West Africa had the largest outbreak of the dis-
ease in history.8 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates 
that this outbreak resulted in 28,616 cases of Ebola, and 11,310 deaths 
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea alone.9 Yet the comparatively 
trivial number of cases that occurred in Europe (three) and the United 
States (four)10 spurred international action and resulted in large-scale 
militarized responses. The full toll of the epidemic in West Africa is 
still being uncovered—with recent reports showing that Ebola can lin-
ger in survivors’ eyes causing painful disease, cataracts, and potential 
blindness in the young and old.11 
 This Article argues that the disproportionate distribution of infec-
tious diseases like Ebola is a form of structural violence. Structural 
violence is a term that is little explored in law but well developed by 
scholars of development and global public health. Influential peace 
scholar Johan Galtung argued that structural violence is unique in 
that the violence is built into the structure and manifests as “unequal 
                                                                                                                       
U.N. TRUST FUND FOR HUM. SEC., HUMAN SECURITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT AND THE UNITED NATIONS TRUST FUND FOR HUMAN 
SECURITY 5 (2009), http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecu-
rity/files/human_security_in_theory_and_practice_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY43-
9TTR] (archived Jan. 29, 2018). 
7 See Ebola Virus Disease Transmission, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/index.html [https://perma.cc/GB2D-X6VT] 
(archived Jan. 29, 2018).  
8 See Melissa Leach, The Ebola Crisis and Post-2015 Development, 27 J. INT’L DEV. 816, 
816 (2015) (internal citations omitted). 
9 See Ebola Outbreak 2014–2015, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], 
http://who.int/csr/disease/ebola/en/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/S4XM-
ZV4A] (archived Jan. 29, 2018). 
10 See 2014 Ebola Outbreak Case Counts, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html (last up-
dated Apr. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/N333-HAVC] (archived Jan. 29, 2018). 
11 Denise Grady, Ebola’s Legacy: Children with Cataracts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/health/ebola-survivors-cataracts.html 
[https://perma.cc/C22V-AYPG] (archived Jan. 29, 2018).  
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power and consequently as unequal life chances.”12 Paul Farmer’s 
work in the field of global public health has been helpful in elucidating 
the concept of structural violence to the spread of epidemic diseases.13 
This Article draws on the structural violence literature to reveal the 
ways in which the international legal architecture facilitates the con-
ditions for global health inequities, and in particular for infectious dis-
eases to reach epidemic levels in the Global South. It demonstrates this 
by utilizing a case study of the 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic in West Af-
rica. The Ebola epidemic reflects the unfortunate pattern where “the 
fruits of medical and scientific advances are stockpiled for some and 
denied to others.”14 
 This Article addresses gaps in the literature by writing on an epi-
demic that has received scant attention in legal scholarship.15 In con-
trast, there has been much scholarship on other epidemics like 
HIV/AIDS,16 Avian Flu, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS). Moreover, while the concept of structural violence is well es-
tablished in the fields of development and health, most analyses elide 
the role of the law in facilitating structural violence.17 This Article de-
parts from this practice and analyzes how the concept of structural vi-
olence can be operationalized in law. It demonstrates how interna-
tional law and its various actors can facilitate structural violence 
through analyzing the case study of the Ebola epidemic.  
 This Article considers the following issues: How is violence con-
ceptualized internationally? When and why do states, international in-
stitutions, and other nonstate actors intervene in violent crises? What 
should such intervention look like? This Article explores these lines of 
inquiry by examining the global public health and international peace 
and security regimes’ responses to the Ebola epidemic. This Article has 
many important contributions. First, the way international actors con-
ceptualize crises needs to be expanded beyond merely addressing direct 
                                                                                                                       
12 Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167, 171 (1967). 
13 Paul Farmer et al., Structural Violence and Clinical Medicine, 3 PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED. 
1686, 1686–91 (2006). 
14 Paul Farmer, Pathologies of Power: Rethinking Health and Human Rights, 89 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 1486, 1488 (1999). 
15 See, e.g., Alison Agnew, A Combative Disease: The Ebola Epidemic in International 
Law, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 97 (2016); J. Benton Heath, Global Emergency Power 
in the Age of Ebola, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1 (2016). 
16 See, e.g., Emily Mendenhall & Shane Norris, When HIV is Ordinary and Diabetes 
New: Remaking Suffering in a South African Township, 10 GLOBAL PUB. HEALTH 449 
(2015); Joia S. Mukherjee, Structural Violence, Poverty and the AIDS Pandemic, 50 DEV. 
115 (2007); Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck, Beyond Sex: Legal Reform for HIV/AIDS and 
Poverty Reduction, 15 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 781 (2008); Ayaz Qureshi, Structural 
Violence and the State: HIV and Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, 20 
ANTHROPOLOGY & MED. 209 (2013). 
17 See generally Anne Wilkinson & Melissa Leach, Briefing: Ebola– Myths, Realities, and 
Structural Violence, 114 AFRICAN AFF. 136 (2014). 
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physical violence internationally, but to also include remedying struc-
tural violence. Additionally, this Article finds that it is more useful to 
theorize violence as a continuum—with the narrower end of the spec-
trum having the minimal conceptualization of violence (direct, physical 
and psychological) and the other end of the spectrum having the 
broader conceptualization of structural violence. Moreover, this study 
of the Ebola epidemic indicates that the complicated relationship be-
tween infectious diseases and conflict warrants more robust attention 
and resources. Finally, shared international responsibility norms 
should be developed to respond to epidemics more effectively and to 
assist in addressing the accountability gaps that arise in international 
law with issues of structural violence.  
 This Article’s analysis of the Ebola outbreak brings into stark fo-
cus the illusory international community. It is only when infectious 
diseases like Ebola come perilously close to impacting countries in the 
Global North that the international community and its various actors 
muster the political will to act. The sad reality is that infectious dis-
eases are left to run rampant for years in countries in the Global South 
where disposable bodies of people of color are disproportionately af-
fected. To be sure, there are a range of domestic factors from inade-
quate health policies, to corruption, to poor governance, amongst oth-
ers that help to account for the current distribution of infectious 
diseases, and there are undoubtedly variations within countries in the 
Global South. Yet recognizing the existence of a state’s duty to address 
these failures does not preclude “a full investigation into the ways in 
which international actors can be deeply implicated in the deprivation 
suffered.”18 
 This Article is organized as follows: Part II provides the theoreti-
cal framework of structural violence, its contenders, and its use in var-
ious fields. Part II also provides the legal framework in international 
law. Part III analyzes the ex ante factors that enabled structural vio-
lence resulting in differential risks for infection and more adverse con-
sequences from Ebola among the impacted countries—Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone. Part IV examines the international regimes for 
health and security and demonstrates how these regimes facilitated 
the conditions that worsened the 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic and ana-
lyzes their responses to mitigate the harm. Part V discusses the theo-
retical and policy implications of this study, examining the limits of the 
law governing international responsibility and the promise of interna-
tional disaster law to respond to the challenges posed by diseases like 
Ebola. The ease with which the Ebola virus spread makes this Article 
                                                                                                                       
18 Margo E. Salomon, From NIEO to NOW and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Jus-
tice, 62 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 31, 33 (2013). 
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timely, and of scholarly and policy interest, both nationally and glob-
ally. 
II. THEORETICAL & LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Conceptual Framework: Structural Violence 
 Violence is traditionally conceptualized as direct physical or psy-
chological violence.19 Structural violence expands the orthodox view of 
violence and is used to describe indirect violence that is not necessarily 
tied to an identifiable human actor.20 Structural violence complicates 
conventional wisdom because it does not conceive of violence as spec-
tacular, sensational, or hyper visible.21 Galtung conceptualized struc-
tural violence in the field of peace-building as present “when human 
beings are being influenced so that their actual . . . realizations are be-
low their potential realizations.”22 Galtung’s conceptualization of 
structural violence as social injustice is overly broad.  
 Paul Farmer improved upon the theory and applied it in the field 
of global public health. He defined it as a “way of describing social ar-
rangements that put individuals and populations in harm’s way . . . . 
The arrangements are structural because they are embedded in the 
political and economic organization of [a society]; they are violent be-
cause they cause injury to people.”23 Structural violence manifests in 
global public health with the differential risks for infection and, among 
those already infected, for adverse consequences including death, in-
jury, and illness.24 
 Structural violence is linked intimately with social inequality be-
cause “these conditions are the cause and result of . . . wars both de-
clared and undeclared.”25 Structural violence manifests in many 
forms, from gross inequality in the distribution of incomes to heavily 
skewed literacy and education rates, or uneven distributions of epi-
demic rates.26 And, because structural violence is often silent or oth-
erwise obscured, the object(s) of it as well as others may not perceive it 
                                                                                                                       
19 Galtung, supra note 12, at 171. 
20 Id. 
21 See ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR 13 (2011). 
22 Galtung, supra note 12, at 168. 
23 Farmer et al., supra note 13, at 1686. 
24 See Paul Farmer, An Anthropology of Structural Violence, 45 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 305, 308 (2004). 
25 Id. at 317. 
26 Galtung, supra note 12, at 177. 
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as violence at all, or presume that the status quo distribution of social, 
economic, legal, and political structures is natural.27 Yet structural vi-
olence is not simply about the unequal distribution of resources, but 
about the power to decide over the distribution of resources.  
  Scholars and practitioners use the concept of structural violence 
in the areas of transitional justice and human rights,28 where much of 
my prior writing has focused. It is also reflected in the work of 2004 
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Wangari Maathai, whose Greenbelt Move-
ment illustrated the connection between structural violence and envi-
ronmental concerns. Additionally, it is commonly used in the work of 
postcolonial scholars.29 There are a number of complementary and 
competing frameworks to structural violence.30 For example, the no-
tion of social (structural) determinants of health is an analogous con-
cept to structural violence.31 It refers to the complex and overlapping 
social and economic structures that are responsible for most health in-
equities.32 Social (structural) determinants of health are shaped by the 
distribution of money, power, and resources throughout local commu-
nities and nations globally.33 It is sometimes used in the public health 
literature in lieu of structural violence.   
  Some scholars have critiqued structural violence as a concept that 
is too much of a black box. A few commentators label structural vio-
                                                                                                                       
27 Id. at 173. 
28 See, e.g., Louise Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition, 40 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. POL. 4, 48 n.22 (2007); Matthew Evans, Structural Violence, Socioeco-
nomic Rights and Transformative Justice, 15 J. HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (2016); Wendy Lam-
bourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence, 3 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28 (2009); Rama Mani, Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Jus-
tice or Forging the Nexus Between Transitional Justice and Development, 2 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253, 254–55 (2008). 
29 See, e.g., ACHILLE MBEMBE, ON THE POSTCOLONY: STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF 
SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2001). 
30 See NIXON, supra note 21, at 3. 
31 See generally COMMISSION ON SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, WHO, THE GAP IN 
A GENERATION: HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF 
HEALTH (2007), http://www.who.int/social_determinants/resources/csdh_framework_ac-
tion_05_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/W923-57NE] (archived Jan. 29, 2018). 
32 See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Meeting the Basic Survival Needs of the World’s Least 
Healthy People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 GEO. L. J. 331, 
333 (2008). 
33 See, e.g., Lant Pritchett & Lawrence H. Summers, Wealthier is Healthier, 31 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 841 (1996); A. PRÜSS-ÜSTÜN & C. CORVALÁN, WHO, PREVENTING DISEASE 
THROUGH HEALTHY ENVIRONMENTS: TOWARDS AN ESTIMATE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
BURDEN OF DISEASE (2006), http://www.who.int/quantifying_ehimpacts/publications/ 
prevdisexecsume.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2HG-FZS6] (archived Feb. 8, 2008). 
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lence as a concept that “has no meaning” and a categorization of vio-
lence as simply what the “user of the term does not like.”34 By calling 
something “violent,” the speaker implicitly seeks to designate the issue 
with a certain importance that escalates it up the policy agenda. These 
commentators admonish that all social ills need not be considered “vi-
olent” in order to recognize that they bring human suffering and need 
to be eradicated.35 Further, due to the limitations of international law 
in addressing instances of mass direct violence, commentators may be 
reluctant to embrace structural violence as a conceptual matter or oth-
erwise. The fear is that an expanded conceptualization of violence 
might detract attention from “real” violence and the much-needed re-
sources and political will that are necessary to address it. Yet this pre-
sents a false dichotomy—by zeroing in on the narrow conceptualization 
of violence, it is as if international coordination and action can only 
galvanize towards one goal.  
  On the other hand, direct or physical violence corresponds with 
intuitions around “what drama is.”36 While both direct and indirect 
violence involve harm to individuals, there is an assumption that direct 
violence causes more suffering than structural violence.37 This dichot-
omy between direct and indirect violence reflects the bias and hierar-
chy internationally in which situations involving mass personal vio-
lence are crises that require urgent international action, while 
structural violence becomes quotidian and less susceptible to re-
dress.38 Structural violence as a frame assists with this unmasking 
and challenges the “normal state of affairs,” which can produce death 
on a massive scale39 without an international response because visi-
bility is otherwise obscured.   
 Further, how violence is theorized is important because it shapes 
perceptions of the world and defines permissible and impermissible ac-
tions. The minimalist and the expansive understandings of violence 
have different starting points—the former from the point of view of the 
perpetrator (violence as intentional), and the latter from the point of 
                                                                                                                       
34 Kjell Eide, Note on Galtung’s Concept of “Violence,” 8 J. PEACE RES. 71, 71 (1971); see 
also JOHN KEANE, REFLECTIONS OF VIOLENCE (1996); C.A.J. Coady, The Idea of Violence, 
3 J. APPLIED PHIL. 3, 4 (1986); Jean-Pierre Derriennic, Theory and Ideologies of Violence, 
9 J. PEACE RES. 361, 362 (1972); Claire Thomas, Why Don’t We Talk about “Violence” in 
International Relations?, 37 REV. INT’L STUD. 1815, 1825 (2011). 
35 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 34, at 1832.  
36 Galtung, supra note 12, at 171. 
37 Id.  
38 See Benjamin Authers & Hilary Charlesworth, International Human Rights Law and 
the Language of Crisis 15 (Ctr. for Int’l Governance & Just., Working Paper No. 18, 
2013). 
39 See, e.g., AKHIL GUPTA, RED TAPE: BUREAUCRACY, STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE, AND 
POVERTY IN INDIA 72 (2012). 
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view of the victim (violence as violation).40 It may seem impossible to 
bridge the gulf between the ideological and methodological approaches 
to violence. This Article challenges this false dichotomy where violence 
is either narrowly understood or broadly conceptualized. Instead, it ar-
gues that it is more illuminating to theorize violence as a continuum—
with the narrower end of the spectrum having the minimal conceptu-
alization of violence (direct, physical, and psychological) and the other 
end of the spectrum having the broader conceptualization of structural 
violence. Violence as a continuum facilitates coherence around the 
range of human experience with violence—from the physical, to the 
psychological, to symbolic, systemic, and structural. Theorizing vio-
lence as a continuum also allows consideration of accumulated actions 
or inactions over time that produce culpable harm, as opposed to the 
narrow conceptualization which conceives of violence as immediate, ev-
ident, and instantaneously registered.41 Further, violence as a contin-
uum allows focus on the discursive and ideological processes by which 
everyday violence is “normalized” and “naturalized” in public con-
sciousness.42 Viewing violence as a continuum does not lead to false 
equivalencies between concepts that need to be differentiated.  
 Yet the narrower end of the spectrum comports with how many 
conceptualize violence—where there is a clear causal connection be-
tween the subject, the object, and an action.43 While structural vio-
lence does not ordinarily involve cognizable crimes, criminal law doc-
trine is nonetheless helpful in better understanding the role of 
causation in structural violence. In other words, one automatically 
wonders, if the actor(s) refrained from action, would the result of struc-
tural violence have occurred anyway? However, structural violence 
tends to involve issues of overdetermination, or too much causation. By 
directing attention to the arrangements of and relationship between 
the parts or elements of a complex whole, structural violence contem-
plates as a foundational matter that many causes can lead to the same 
outcome.44   
 As such, structural violence as a concept requires the right inquir-
ies about causation. Under traditional principles of criminal law, in the 
face of instances of too much causation, different questions apply:  
 
                                                                                                                       
40 See Vittorio Bufacchi, Two Concepts of Violence, 3 POL. STUD. REV. 193, 196 (2005). 
41 Galtung, supra note 12, at 171. 
42 See, e.g., Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Dangerous and Endangered Youth: Social Struc-
tures and Determinants of Violence, 1036 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 13–46 (2004). 
43 Galtung, supra note 12, at 171. 
44 See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem 
of Many Hands, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905 (1980). 
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(1) whether the actor's actions were a substantial factor in produc-
ing the result, regardless of whether the outcome might have oc-
curred anyway;  
 (2) whether the actor’s actions hastened the result; or  
(3) whether the actor’s actions made survival less likely as a re-
sult.45   
 
These inquiries are important because without examining them one 
would tend to stop at the first-level question—whether the result 
would have occurred but for the actor’s actions. Yet situations of struc-
tural violence would not satisfy the first-level inquiry, because it ap-
pears that the outcome would have occurred regardless of the actor’s 
actions. Seemingly, the actions of the actor(s) made no difference to the 
resulting structural violence, but this would be an incorrect conclusion 
and elide the realities of situations of overdetermination. Because 
structural violence is characterized by overdetermination, it is critical 
to delve deeper than when ordinarily conceptualizing violence. Failure 
to ask the right queries may lead to inaccuracies in identifying what 
actor or actors are responsible for what.46 Moreover, in determining 
responsibility in criminal law—causation cannot be established if the 
result is so remote that it makes holding the actor accountable illegiti-
mate.47 In other words, if the result was reasonably foreseeable to the 
actor, then the actor’s actions are considered sufficient to establish cau-
sation, and it is considered fair to hold the actor accountable.   
 Criminal law doctrine is also helpful in better understanding what 
to make of failures to act, when the result is structural violence. Under 
general principles of criminal law, actors can directly perpetrate crimes 
through affirmative voluntary acts or through not acting, when there 
is a duty to do so.48 Similarly, structural violence can be perpetrated 
through both commission and omission. Where structural violence oc-
curs as the result of a failure to act, there is greater risk that the cul-
pable harm occasioned by this failure will be misattributed or not at-
tributed at all to the relevant actor(s) than in cases of direct violence. 
The established criminal law rules for deciding omission liability are 
similarly helpful in determining when an actor’s failure to act can be 
considered blameworthy for the resulting structural violence. Gener-
ally, in criminal law an actor is not required to act unless there is: 
 
                                                                                                                       
45 JENS OHLIN, CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINE, APPLICATION, AND PRACTICE 192, 198 (2016). 
46 Cf. André Nollkaemper, Political Economy and the Responsibility of States: The Prob-
lem of Many Hands in International Law, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 278, 289–97 (Fabbricotti ed., 2016). 
47 OHLIN, supra note 45, at 209. 
48 Id. at 116–17. 
 
2017]        EBOLA DOES NOT FALL FROM THE SKY 12 
 
 (1) some law that imposes a duty; 
(2) a relationship status recognized by law as imposing a duty;  
 (3) a contractual duty;  
(4) an actor who voluntarily assumes care secluding the person 
from receiving care from a third party; or 
 (5) an actor who has created the harm in the first place.49   
 
These criminal law concepts are helpful for elucidating the forms of 
structural violence that can occur via omission.  
 This Article employs these principles to reveal how certain inter-
national actors enabled structural violence with Ebola through omis-
sion. Further, criminal law doctrine provides important guidelines 
about how the concept of structural violence can be operationalized in 
law and may assist with showing causation for structural violence 
more generally. However, this does not suggest that the appropriate 
response to structural violence once attribution of responsibility has 
occurred is to resort to criminal law or even tort law as a form of secur-
ing redress for structural violence internationally. This is because in-
ternationally few forums, if any, exist that would have both subject 
matter and personal jurisdiction over claims involving structural vio-
lence. As noted earlier, structural violence does not necessarily involve 
cognizable crimes domestically or internationally. Accordingly, this Ar-
ticle prioritizes legal reform initiatives aimed at bettering the legal re-
gimes that are charged with responding to the structural violence wit-
nessed with epidemics. Additionally, this Article calls for an expansion 
of the current frameworks for international responsibility and interna-
tional disaster law in order to better address incidents of structural 
violence seen with infectious diseases.  
 This Article utilizes the concept of structural violence as a literal 
and rhetorical tool to highlight the harm caused by the operation of 
international law and actors through action and inaction during the 
West African Ebola outbreak. Structural violence as a framework in 
this Article helps to draw attention to the arrangement of and relation-
ship between the parts or elements of complex legal regimes. This 
framework aids in foregrounding the background—the human-made 
laws, policies, and conditions that gave rise to the Ebola epidemic. This 
Article employs the concept to help to expose the fallacy of infectious 
diseases as purely biological or naturally occurring events50 and in-
stead highlights the lethal interaction between inequality and infec-
                                                                                                                       
49 See People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129–30 (Mich. 1907) (describing the condi-
tions under which a person is required to act). 
50 See Susan Marks, Human Rights and the Bottom Billion, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
37, 47 (2009). 
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tious diseases. Structural violence as a framework assists with identi-
fying actors, actions, laws, policies, and omissions that might otherwise 
be unacknowledged. In this way, the concept assists with apportioning 
partial responsibility and undermining simplistic accounts where epi-
demics like Ebola just happen spontaneously, like manna from the sky, 
or at most due to local backwardness. In sum, this subpart clarified the 
framework of structural violence, discussed how it can be operational-
ized in law, and concluded that theorizing violence as a continuum bet-
ter comports with people’s lived experiences with violence. 
B. Legal Framework: International Law 
 This Article uses the legal framework of international law because 
international law increasingly addresses almost every type of human 
activity, including those typically considered within the exclusive do-
mestic jurisdiction of states—like health. States turn to international 
law and institutions to achieve common aims, solve shared problems, 
promote compliance with norms, reduce transaction costs, provide in-
formation, and coordinate orderly and peaceful dispute resolution. 
 Yet international law and its various participants are by no means 
neutral. Instead, international law reflects important sites of power 
contestation between the Global North and the Global South, among 
other cleavages.51 These cleavages have historical roots in patterns of 
domination and exploitation by countries in the Global North: from the 
plunder of resources, to slavery, to colonialism, and to neocolonial-
ism.52 Generally speaking, the Global South has had to function as 
“international law takers” on a range of social, political, and economic 
issues.53 These rules are backed by coercion from the ever-expanding 
conditionalities imposed by international organizations (IOs), or from 
the neglect of attention paid to social and economic realities in much of 
the Global South by these institutions.54 IOs and international law 
more generally have functioned in a way that enables questions of so-
cial and economic inequality to be treated as solely a matter of concern 
and responsibility of the territorial state, which has freed them from 
having to mitigate the social and economic inequalities that result from 
                                                                                                                       
51 Notably, the least advantaged are not always located outside of the “developed” North. 
See, e.g., Volker Heins, Realizing Honneth: Redistribution, Recognition, and Global Jus-
tice, 4 J. GLOBAL ETHICS 141, 146 (2008). 
52 See Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an In-
sider-Outsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841, 843–44 (2000). 
53 See generally Andrew Hurrell, Global Inequality and International Institutions, 32 
METAPHILOSOPHY 34 (2003). 
54 See id. 
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the functioning of international law, IOs, and state and nonstate ac-
tors. 
 Historically, the field of international law has deprioritized issues 
of structural violence that underpin everyday life.55 Accordingly, eco-
nomic and social rights, no matter how prolonged or systematic, recede 
drably into the background.56 And, international actors view human 
rights law violations affecting civil and political rights as more severe 
and deserving of action. In part, this is due to the view that determin-
ing accountability for breaches of civil and political rights appears 
more straightforward than for economic and social rights. And, the pre-
occupation with direct physical violence in international law restricts 
it through its inattentiveness to persistent patterns of violations of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights. While on occasion violations of these 
rights are imbued with the rhetoric of crises (for example, in the case 
of natural disasters, famine, or infectious diseases), the longer the sit-
uation persists, the more the sense of urgency dissipates.57 Accord-
ingly, violations of economic and social rights are perceived as less sus-
ceptible to international coordination, action, and reform.58 This 
neglect of the importance of the economic and social sector has ren-
dered already fragile countries in the Global South ill-equipped to deal 
with pandemics, which was witnessed during the Ebola epidemic. How-
ever, highly infectious diseases do not respect borders and pose trans-
national challenges that require international cooperation and action. 
III. WARS DECLARED AND UNDECLARED & THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC 
 The Ebola epidemic vividly illustrates the relationship between 
war and disease. In some sense it is not coincidental that the epidemic 
most impacted three post-conflict countries struggling to rebuild—Li-
beria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. This Part demonstrates how the fail-
ure to conceptualize violence as a continuum may lead to haphazard 
and incomplete post-conflict measures and interventions that may help 
the sore, but do not heal the wounds. It examines how the international 
community’s focus on stemming “real” violence deprioritized address-
ing structural violence impacting the social and economic sectors. Post-
                                                                                                                       
55 See Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline in Crisis, 65 MODERN L. 
REV. 377, 391 (2002) (“One way forward is to refocus international law on issues of struc-
tural justice that underpin everyday life.”). 
56 See Authers & Charlesworth, supra note 38, at 14. 
57 Id. at 17. 
58 Id. at 20. 
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conflict interventions effectively ignored the decimated health care sys-
tem left in the aftermath of years of neglect and conflict and created 
fertile ground for the Ebola pandemic. 
A. Guinea, Liberia & Sierra Leone before Ebola 
 This subpart analyzes the ex ante factors that enabled structural 
violence resulting in differential risks for infection from Ebola among 
the impacted countries. Underdevelopment, conflict, and failures of 
post-conflict reconstruction meant that Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea were subject to more adverse consequences from structural vi-
olence during the 2014–2015 Ebola epidemic.  
1. Underdevelopment in the Sub-Region 
 While diseases can affect all countries, poorer countries tend to 
suffer the greatest impact and are more vulnerable in cases of epidemic 
diseases.59 The Ebola epidemic was able to wreak havoc in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone in large part because these are some of the 
poorest countries in the world, with Liberia ranking 175 out of 187 
countries on the UN Development Program’s Human Development In-
dex, just in front of Sierra Leone at 177 and Guinea at 178.60 Histori-
cally, these countries have had their rich natural and human resources 
extracted for the benefit of local elites and foreigners.61 This pattern 
of exploitation left a lasting legacy on the sub-region. Some commenta-
tors have painted this region of West Africa as remote or removed from 
the world and the forces of globalization.62 Yet this region has been 
very connected: serving as a central place in the transatlantic slave 
trade, part of the West African trading empires in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and a source of supply for labor and commodities 
to Britain, France, and American-Liberian powers.63 
 Yet even after formal independence, similar patterns of exploita-
tion persisted. For example, the dominance of extractive industries has 
continued—with huge international mining corporations, oil interests, 
and logging and other industries controlling significant sectors of the 
                                                                                                                       
59 See Puymbroeck, supra note 16, at 783. 
60 See Daniel G. Bausch & Lara Schwarz, Outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea: 
Where Ecology Meets Economy, 8 PUB. LIBR. SCI. NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES 4 
(2014). 
61 See Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 137. 
62 See, e.g., Bausch & Schwarz, supra note 60. 
63 Leach, supra note 8, at 820. 
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economy.64 The historical reliance on the extractive sector for economic 
development led to wealth for a few individuals, while most were sub-
jected to precarious lifestyles outside of the formal economy in over-
crowded urban areas.65 For instance, despite being rich in natural and 
mineral resources, Guinea has the eighth lowest gross national income 
per capita in the world, and poverty has been on the rise since 2003.66 
Further, a survey in 2011 found large income gaps across all three 
countries with the top 20 percent earning between 40 and 46 percent 
of national income, and the bottom 20 percent earning between 20 and 
22 percent.67 Moreover, even though Liberia and Sierra Leone had 
some of the highest growth rates globally, the vast majority of people’s 
lived experiences was and is defined by continued or growing pov-
erty.68 
 Further, Cold War politics meant that the Global North often dis-
pensed international aid to support authoritarian regimes in the sub-
region from Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone, to Samuel K. Doe in Libe-
ria, to Lansana Conté in Guinea. Stevens and the other leaders were 
allowed to appropriate aid revenues and to undermine state services, 
in return for allegiance.69 The money lent to these corrupt and undem-
ocratic regimes to build white-elephant infrastructure projects served 
dubious purposes and had limited utility.70 The payments for these 
projects, combined with the perpetually imbalanced trade patterns be-
tween the countries in the sub-region who relied on exporting extrac-
tive and agricultural goods and importing informational and industrial 
goods from the Global North, resulted in a chronic cycle of unsustain-
able debt where countries borrowed to pay their debts.71 
                                                                                                                       
64 See id. at 820–21; see also INST. OF DEV. STUDIES, EBOLA AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY 
(2015). 
65 See Leach, supra note 8, at 822. 
66 See Bausch & Schwarz, supra note 60, at 5. 
67 Bottom 20% Incomes, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
SI.DST.FRST.20 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7WQA-QVLM] (archived 
Jan. 29, 2018). 
68 See INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF], WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: RECOVERY 
STRENGTHENS, REMAINS UNEVEN 69 (2014). 
69 Dele Ogunmola, From Civil War to Political Parties: A Comparison of Insurgent Move-
ments in West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, and Their Metamorphosis 
Into Political Parties, 14 GLOBAL J. OF HUM. SOC. SCI. 4, 5 (2014). 
70 See Brook Baker, The Impact of the International Monetary Fund’s Macroeconomic 
Policies on the AIDS Pandemic, 40 INT’L J. HEALTH SERV. 347, 349 (2010). 
71 Id. 
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 Adding to this vulnerability in the region were reform policies of 
international financial institutions, which undermined already com-
promised health systems.72 These reform policies affirmatively ena-
bled structural violence in the public health sector. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has been active in West Africa for decades, with 
its first loan in Liberia beginning in 1963.73 Similarly, since 1984 the 
IMF has given consistent support to Sierra Leone and Guinea.74 The 
IMF provided loans to encourage the “structural adjustment” of an 
economy as a condition for extending and refinancing debt. The auster-
ity measures included cutting the budget deficit and improving the bal-
ance of payments. This was accomplished through budget ceilings, 
wage caps, and/or reductions in wages in the public sector.75 These re-
strictions prioritized short-term economic objectives over longer-term 
investments in public health, and the result predictably hollowed out 
the flailing health sector.76 For example, an independent evaluation of 
the IMF’s loan programs surveyed twenty-nine countries in sub-Sa-
haran Africa between 1999 and 2005 and found that 37 percent of all 
annual aid increases were diverted to beefing up currency reserves, 
with another 37 percent going to repay debts in line with the dictates 
of structural adjustment—leaving only 27 percent for health and other 
pressing developmental needs.77  
                                                                                                                       
72 Id. at 347. 
73 See Liberia History of Lending Arrangements as of November 30, 2013, IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?mem-
berKey1=600&date1key=2013-11-30 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9QLJ-
JXUY] (archived Jan. 29, 2018); see also Liberia: Transactions with the Fund from May 
01, 1984 to August 31, 2017, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/ex-
trans1.aspx?memberKey1=600&endDate=2017-08-31 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/T7JB-WRRJ] (archived Jan. 29, 2018). 
74 See Guinea: Transactions with the Fund from May 01, 1984 to August 31, 2017, IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extrans1.aspx?mem-
berKey1=380&endDate=2017-08-31 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3P58-
PNWF] (archived Jan. 28, 2018); see also Sierra Leone: Transactions with the Fund from 
May 01, 1984 to August 31, 2017, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/ex-
trans1.aspx?memberKey1=850&endDate=2017-08-31 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/QL8A-YF4U] (archived Jan. 29, 2018). 
75 Baker, supra note 70, at 347. 
76 Leach, supra note 8, at 823; see David Stuckler et al., The International Monetary 
Fund's Effects on Global Health: Before and After the 2008 Financial Crisis, 39 INT’L J. 
HEALTH SERV. 771 (2009); DAVID GOLDSBOROUGH, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., DOES THE 
IMF CONSTRAIN HEALTH SPENDING IN POOR COUNTRIES? EVIDENCE AND AN AGENDA FOR 
ACTION (2007), http:///www.cgdev.org/doc/IMF/IMF_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 34US-
2SVH] (archived Feb. 8, 2018). 
77 See generally JOANNE SALOP ET AL., INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, IMF, THE IMF AND 
AID TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2007), https://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/ 
2007/ssa/eng/pdf/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2X9-UQLV] (archived Jan. 29, 2018) 
[hereinafter IMF 2007 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION]. 
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 The IMF responded to concerns about its programs from actors 
like the Jubilee Campaign, an international NGO network,78 and pro-
vided partial debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative.79 Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone all had unsus-
tainable debt burdens and met the criteria for HIPC assistance.80 By 
September 2012, all three countries had successfully completed 
HIPC.81 This meant that they had established a good track record of 
performance under IMF and WB sponsored programs, had satisfacto-
rily implemented key reforms, had adopted a poverty reduction strat-
egy paper, and had implemented its recommendations for at least one 
year.82 Debt relief from HIPC is supposed to free up funds for countries 
to use on social spending including health, with the money saved from 
servicing debt.83 While the IMF and WB provided partial debt relief 
under HIPC, full debt relief for most countries is still elusive because 
creditor participation is voluntary and a number of smaller multilat-
eral institutions and bilateral and commercial creditors have not deliv-
ered the anticipated relief. Furthermore, one-third of these creditors 
have delivered no relief at all.84   
 Due to the limitations with HIPC, the Group of Eight created the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005 to allow for further 
debt relief from the WB, the IMF, and the African Development Fund 
on eligible debt for countries that successfully completed HIPC.85 In 
order to qualify for this initiative, countries needed to have a per capita 
income under USD 380 as well as have outstanding debt to these insti-
tutions in 2004.86 Countries also had to demonstrate success in the 
                                                                                                                       
78 See, e.g., South-South Summit Declaration: Towards a Debt-Free Millennium, WORLD 
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (Nov. 21, 1999), https://www.oikoumene.org/ en/resources/docu-
ments/wcc-programmes/public-witness-addressing-power-affirming-peace/poverty-
wealth-and-ecology/finance-speculation-debt/south-south-summit-declaration 
[https://perma.cc/P2XG-9MKM] (archived Jan. 29, 2018). 
79 Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative Fact Sheet, IMF 
(Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
8WWK-TMLB] (archived Jan. 29, 2018) [hereinafter HIPC Fact Sheet]. 
80 See id. 
81 See HIPC Initiative: Publications of Country Cases Considered Under the Initiative, 
IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/eng/pdf/hipccountries.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 
2018) [https://perma.cc/6YDV-RVTB] (archived Jan. 29, 2018). 
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IMF and WB’s stipulated macroeconomic policies, implement a poverty 
reduction strategy program, and successfully manage public expendi-
tures.87 All three countries in the sub-region were eligible for the 
MDRI.88 And, the IMF delivered to Liberia USD 172 million beyond-
HIPC debt relief on June 30, 2010.89 
 However, irrespective of the labeling that the IMF and the WB 
used to describe their programs—from structural adjustment, to good 
governance, or poverty reduction—the underlying logic and macroeco-
nomic policies remained the same.90 Although the IMF has attempted 
to respond to the criticism leveled against it, it continues to prioritize 
“macroeconomic stability above all else.”91 Indeed, prior to the Ebola 
outbreak, although all three countries had successfully met the IMF's 
macroeconomic policy prescriptions, they had all failed to meet targets 
for social spending, including health.92 
 Moreover, to keep government spending low, the IMF placed lim-
itations on public-sector wages, which meant that money to employ and 
adequately remunerate doctors, nurses, and other health care profes-
sionals was limited.93 As health care employment opportunities less-
ened, health care quality and a capable health care workforce concom-
itantly decreased. Furthermore, depressed wages in the public health 
system contributed to the brain-drain problem in the health sector 
(where indigenous talent leaves for greener, more prosperous pas-
tures).94 For instance, even before the Ebola epidemic hit, in a survey 
of health care workers for every thousand persons found, Guinea could 




90 See Daniel W. Muriu, The Imperial-Emancipatory Paradox of International Human 
Rights: How Useful is the Right to Health in Sub-Saharan Africa?, 9 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 
387, 401 (2007). 
91 See Baker, supra note 70, at 354, 356. 
92 IMF, Guinea: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and 
Technical Memorandum of Understanding (Feb. 1, 2014); see also IMF, Liberia: Third 
Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Waiver of Non-
observance of Performance Criterion and Modification of Performance Criteria, Country 
Report No. 14/197 (Jul. 11, 2014); IMF, Sierra Leone: First Review Under the Extended 
Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, and Fi-
nancing Assurances Review (Jun. 26, 2014). 
93 See IMF 2007 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION, supra note 77. 
94 See Karen McColl, Fighting the Brain Drain, 337 BRIT. MED. J. 958, 958 (2008); D. 
McCoy et al., Salaries and Incomes of Health Workers in sub-Saharan Africa, 371 
LANCET 675 (2008); ERIC FRIEDMAN, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AN ACTION PLAN 
TO PREVENT BRAIN DRAIN: BUILDING EQUITABLE HEALTH SYSTEMS IN AFRICA (2004), 
http://allafrica.com/download/resource/main/main/ida-
tcs/00010242:21e6b22646882263f8b7aa73a71c810c.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B73-R6N8] 
(archived Jan. 29, 2018). 
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only count 0.1 doctors, Liberia 0.014, and Sierra Leone 0.022.95 In Si-
erra Leone, the structural adjustment policies of the IMF between 1995 
and 1996 required the reduction of public employment, which resulted 
in the retrenchment of 28 percent of governmental employees,96 with 
limits on wages continuing into the 2000s.97 This directly affected 
health, as statistics provided by the WHO show a reduction of commu-
nity health workers from 0.11 per 1,000 population in 2004 to 0.02 in 
2008.98 While it is impossible to isolate how much of the lack of health 
workers was caused by structural adjustment, it seems plausible that 
these reform policies were at least a substantial factor in producing 
this result.99 Accordingly, the effect of structural adjustment reforms 
were detrimental for the supply of health services—by insisting on cuts 
in health spending to manage public expenditures.  
 Additionally, structural adjustment reforms also had a negative 
impact on the demand for health services—by reducing household in-
come, thus leaving people with less money for health. Due to the IMF’s 
and the WB’s policies, public health was transformed into a commodity 
and an individual responsibility.100 For example, in Sierra Leone, de-
spite the government’s introduction of a free health care initiative, it 
continued to charge fees for services, which limited access.101 This was 
influenced by the IMF’s admonition to “carefully assess the fiscal im-
plications” of providing free health care services.102   
 Indeed, studies have shown that the IMF’s policies have slowed 
down improvements in, or worsened, the health status of people in 
                                                                                                                       
95 Global Health Observatory Data Repository: Density per 1,000, by country, WHO (Feb. 
2, 2017), http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.92100 [https://perma.cc/249X-MNSG] 
(archived Feb. 8, 2018). 
96 IMF, Sierra Leone: Midterm Review Under the Second Annual Arrangement Under 
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Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Financing Assurances 
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countries implementing them.103 The results elsewhere reportedly in-
clude increased incidences of infectious diseases like tuberculosis.104 
It is not a far stretch to see how the depletion of investment in health 
services contributed towards higher incidences of Ebola in the sub-re-
gion. In Guinea, for example, beginning in the 2000s, the IMF pro-
moted fiscal and administrative decentralization.105 The idea behind 
decentralization is presumably to make care more responsive to local 
demands; however, this move also makes it difficult to plan a coordi-
nated response to an epidemic like Ebola.106 Five years after Guinea 
complied with IMF dictates to transfer budgetary responsibilities from 
the central government to the local level,107 an IMF mission to the 
country found governance problems, ineffective decentralization, and 
deterioration of the quality of health-service delivery.108 While corre-
lation does not equal causality, the analysis above indicates that the 
collective effects of the structural adjustment programs potentially 
made survival from an epidemic disease in the impacted countries less 
likely. During the midst of the Ebola crisis, the IMF belatedly recog-
nized the connection between its policies and the outbreak. IMF Direc-
tor Christine Lagarde said at a meeting on the epidemic, “It is good to 
increase the fiscal deficit when it's a matter of curing the people, of 
taking the precautions to actually try to contain the disease. The IMF 
doesn't say that very often.”109 
                                                                                                                       
103 See David Stuckler et al., International Monetary Fund Programs and Tuberculosis 
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 The analysis above briefly examines how underdevelopment 
shaped the trajectory of the sub-region. The effects of historical exploi-
tation, structural adjustment, and the debt crises are cumulative 
causes, contributing substantially to the structural violence witnessed 
during the Ebola epidemic. These factors aggravated the course of the 
disease because they enabled the bankrupting of the public health sec-
tor, which lacked preparedness and robustness to cope with the Ebola 
outbreak once it hit. Moreover, the resulting structural violence that 
occurred was a foreseeable result of the actions of the international ac-
tors discussed above.  
2. Conflict in the Sub-Region 
 Uneven development, the neglect of rural areas, and exclusionary 
governance also created ripe conditions for conflict in all three coun-
tries and continued insecurity afterwards. The conflicts in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone were interrelated wars resulting in over three hundred 
thousand deaths (approximately fifty thousand in Sierra Leone110 and 
over two hundred fifty thousand in Liberia),111 creating millions of ref-
ugees and internally displaced people.112 Liberia and Sierra Leone 
quickly deteriorated as warlords throughout each country competed for 
political power and economic resources, which decimated each coun-
try’s flailing infrastructure and left each country without electricity, 
sewage, or running water. The war in Sierra Leone is internationally 
known for mass amputations and the forcible recruitment of children. 
Other violations included forced cannibalism, sexual slavery, assault, 
torture, rape, and looting as well as property destruction.113 Similar 
human rights violations were committed in the civil war in Liberia.114 
The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone had a spillover effect into 
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neighboring Guinea.115 The conflict in Guinea led to the death of over 
one thousand Guineans and displacement of more than one hundred 
thousand Guineans.116  
In the aftermath of the conflicts in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone, many vital state institutions were nonexistent or significantly 
weakened. For example, in 2008, the Index of State Weakness in the 
Developing World (Index), which ranks all 141 developing countries 
according to their performance in four key areas—economics, politics, 
security, and social welfare—ranked Liberia ninth, Sierra Leone thir-
teenth, and Guinea twenty-third (with a lower ranking representing 
poorer performance).117 The Index categorized all three countries as 
“critically weak states,” defined as those states “least capable of ful-
filling most, if not all, of the four critical functions of government.”118 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were ranked in the bottom percent-
age of all states in providing social welfare to its citizens, with Sierra 
Leone faring the worst.119 The Index considered six factors: child mor-
tality,120 primary school completion, prevalence of undernourishment, 
access to improved water sources, and improved sanitation facilities, 
as well as life expectancy.121 This provides some sense of the level of 
comparative social deprivation in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia 
prior to the Ebola outbreak.  
 This subpart briefly highlights how conflict exacerbated uneven 
development in the sub-region. Direct physical violence was a substan-
tial factor in producing the resulting structural violence in all three 
countries. The legacies of wars both declared and undeclared resulted 
in differential risks for infection in the impacted countries during the 
Ebola epidemic, and among those already infected—harmful conse-
quences including death, injury, and illness. The resulting structural 
violence that occurred following the direct violence perpetrated by gov-
ernmental and insurgent actors was reasonably foreseeable. Accord-
ingly, their actions are sufficient to establish causation, and it is fair 
to hold them responsible. The subpart below analyzes how the failures 
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of post-conflict rebuilding compounded structural violence and vulner-
ability in the sub-region enabling Ebola’s spread. 
3. Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Sub-Region 
 Many post-conflict or transitional justice mechanisms are aimed 
primarily at securing negative peace—the absence of violence and the 
cessation of hostilities.122 Yet the concept of positive peace encom-
passes not simply the removal of physical violence, but also the re-
moval of structural violence,123 which enables consideration of the im-
portance of both observable as well as latent violence.124 Further, 
following a conflict there is a need to alleviate not only the injustices 
caused by the conflict, but also the injustices that caused the con-
flict.125 And, in societies that have not experienced a recent history of 
conflict, the insecurity and instability that may result from structural 
violence merit close attention not only from a conflict prevention per-
spective, but also from a social justice perspective. Yet much of the ex-
isting scholarship and practice ignores the priorities and realities of 
post-conflict societies when designing peace-building efforts. 
 This bias towards privileging direct violence occurred when UN 
agencies, donor countries, and a number of international NGOs spear-
headed the post-conflict recovery process in the sub-region. For exam-
ple, post-conflict interventions focus on the Disarmament, Demobiliza-
tion, and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants by providing them 
with skills training, education, and financial incentives to turn in their 
weapons to promote their return to civilian life.126 The DDR programs 
supported by the international community in Sierra Leone provided a 
low salary, tool kits, and skills training to fifty-three thousand ex-com-
batants. In Liberia, the programs disarmed approximately 103,101 ex-
combatants and provided them with USD 300 as well as some skills 
training. A survey conducted by the Human Rights Center at the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley in 2011 in Liberia found that one of 
the top priorities for post-conflict reconstruction was the health sector 
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(42 percent).127 Yet recovery efforts did not properly address this and 
other high-priority issues like lack of employment and education.128 
Akin to post-conflict reconstruction elsewhere, the processes in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone focused on security sector reform. This usually en-
tails a mixture of recruiting, retraining, and removing alleged human 
rights abusers from positions in the police and the army. Moreover, 
following the transition from conflict, the focus was on accountability 
mechanisms like trials and truth commissions—both of which occurred 
in Sierra Leone, while Liberia had a truth commission. The neglect of 
the importance of restructuring the economic and social sectors in the 
sub-region rendered already fragile countries ill-equipped to deal with 
the Ebola outbreak. 
 Indeed, focusing on direct violence and alleged perpetrators ob-
scures the consequences of structural violence. This bias in turn may 
result in “catching the small fry and letting the big fish loose.”129 Ac-
cordingly, the failure to conceptualize violence as a continuum led to 
incomplete post-conflict measures primarily focused on direct physical 
violence; this omission exacerbated deeply rooted social inequalities 
that pre-dated the conflicts.130 The emphasis on post-conflict recon-
struction presumed that the existing structures in society were all 
equally worth rebuilding and had not contributed to marginalization 
and disaffection of individuals and communities. Additionally, the 
weight placed on rebuilding state institutions failed to take into ac-
count that the “state” is an entity that was and continues to be distant 
from the lives of most people in the sub-region.131 As a matter of sur-
vival, people have had to depend on themselves, their communities, 
social networks, and other informal institutions to meet their daily 
needs. This is especially true for the younger members of Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean societies whose formative development took place dur-
ing conflict.132 Even after nominal peace, life remained strikingly sim-
ilar for many. Although violence decreased, people’s levels of insecurity 
and vulnerability persisted.   
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 The failures of post-conflict reconstruction and the remoteness of 
the state133 were especially evident in the health sector. Following the 
implementation of structural adjustment programs, the decreased role 
of the state in providing health services meant that NGOs overtook 
this basic welfare function.134 The beleaguered health systems enabled 
by structural adjustment were even worse following the conflicts in the 
region. A loose arrangement of international institutions led by the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia and in Sierra Leone and composed 
of international NGOs as well as donor countries became responsible 
for managing the state and the health care sector.135 In many ways, 
this network voluntarily assumed care and functioned as the de facto 
government during post-conflict reconstruction. The accumulated ac-
tions and omissions of this coalition of international actors over time 
facilitated structural violence seen during the Ebola outbreak. For ex-
ample, in Liberia this coalition of actors was conflicted about maintain-
ing long-term assistance to the public health sector.136 Instead, they 
devised an ad hoc system, which consisted of a loose collection of clinics 
and hospitals run primarily by international NGOs.137 The fragility of 
this system of health care provision was apparent in 2007 when Doc-
tors Without Borders left the country following the conflict. The lack of 
the vital services they provided resulted in the closure of regional and 
urban hospitals in Liberia. This, concomitant with the closure of thirty 
World Vision clinics in the capital of Liberia, undermined the already 
teetering system.138 
 The loose coalition called an emergency donor conference in 2007 
to avert the burgeoning public health crisis. Donors agreed to provide 
financing, human resources, and medical support to Liberia’s health 
sector through the Liberia Health Sector Pool Fund.139 Donors devel-
oped this fund to provide humanitarian health assistance. Under it, 
the Liberian government and the international development actors de-
termined national health priorities, and the Ministry of Health over-
saw the numerous international NGOs operating in Liberia to provide 
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health services to the populace. Access to the funds was tied to manda-
tory health sector decentralization in order to promote post-conflict re-
construction and democratization.140 Liberia implemented a number 
of reforms under the Pool Fund, but the public health system remained 
“fragmented, underfunded and understaffed.”141 This did not stop an 
enormous bureaucracy from developing in the Ministry which envi-
sioned functions for various health sectors, which due to a lack of re-
sources existed on paper and on the doors of empty offices, but not in 
reality.142 This façade of a health care system has been characterized 
as a literal “application of ‘structural violence’” with the state becoming 
a “vector of disease.”143 
 The legacy of structural adjustment and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion efforts combined to undermine state capacity and reinforce the 
state’s remoteness from the populace, by restricting the space for the 
state to be involved in the provision of health services.144 Conse-
quently, aid organizations delivered more and more services to the 
poor, since governments were shrinking their spending on public ser-
vices.145 This has meant that pre-epidemic contexts and now public 
health centers and hospitals are regarded in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea as places to be avoided and even resisted.146   
 Yet the countries in the sub-region were viewed in many sectors 
as success stories for post-conflict reconstruction.147 This was exempli-
fied when two Liberian women won the Noble Peace Prize in 2011—
President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and peace activist Leymah Gbowee. 
Both Liberia and Sierra Leone avoided relapse into widespread conflict 
and held peaceful elections, indicating that they had turned the page. 
For example, Sierra Leone organized its own election in 2012, and the 
United Nations successfully completed its formal withdrawal of its 
peacekeeping operation from the country in 2014.148 Things improved 
in Guinea as well, especially foreign relations within the sub-region 
following the conflicts. Following several coups and some instability, 
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the political situation had since steadied. Despite these real improve-
ments across the sub-region, Ebola threatened to upend these gains. 
 The devastating results of the fractured system of health care de-
livery permitted by limited post-conflict reconstruction created condi-
tions for structural violence and facilitated Ebola’s spread. This poten-
tially occurred through accelerating the harm caused by the Ebola 
epidemic and/or reducing the likelihood of survival due to the lack of 
resilient health systems. The counterfactual is a ready objection to the 
arguments put forward in this Part, because one can never know what 
would have happened if the coalition of international actors had not 
engaged in post-conflict reconstruction in the sub-region, or if the IMF 
and WB had not required structural adjustment reform policies. On 
this view, it is possible that the resulting harm from the Ebola epi-
demic might have been much worse but for structural adjustment and 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It is futile to attempt to disprove a 
counterfactual given the impossibility of knowing what would occur in 
this alternative universe. More importantly, it seems clear that narrow 
post-conflict reconstruction, structural adjustment policies, and lega-
cies of conflict were at least substantial factors in producing the result-
ing structural violence in all three countries: differing risks for infec-
tion in the impacted countries during the Ebola epidemic, and serious 
adverse consequences among those already infected. Causation is es-
tablished here because the structural violence that occurred during the 
Ebola epidemic was not too accidental in its occurrence to have a just 
bearing on the responsibility of the actors discussed above.  
B. Guinea, Liberia & Sierra Leone in the Time of Ebola 
 The Ebola epidemic implicates a number of fundamental human 
rights, including protections against the arbitrary deprivation of life149 
and the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health under international human 
rights law.150 A fundamental principle of economic social and cultural 
rights is that states “undertake to take steps . . . to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively” the right 
to health as well as other economic, social, and cultural rights.151 This 
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includes the prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic dis-
eases.152 Accordingly, under international law the primary responsi-
bility for responding to pandemics lies with the affected state(s). This 
subpart analyzes the factors that influenced the disproportionate risks 
for infection from Ebola among the impacted countries. It analyzes the 
vulnerabilities in the sub-region that permitted the epidemic to spread 
so quickly, probes the connection between infectious disease and con-
flict, and analyzes how the lackluster local response facilitated struc-
tural violence.  
1. Ebola’s Trajectory in the Sub-Region 
Ebola first appeared in 1976 in separate outbreaks in South Su-
dan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Practitioners have 
speculated that perhaps the virus was able to migrate to West Africa 
from the DRC through fruit bats and was then transmitted to humans 
through deforestation that led to increased hunting and consumption 
of bats.153 This narrative has been challenged as inaccurate because it 
pretends as if people have only recently encountered bats and have not 
cohabitated with them for centuries in the forest.154 It is also problem-
atic because it led to misguided admonitions to not consume “bush 
meat,” which denied an important source of protein to people in condi-
tions of food scarcity.155 Moreover, even if the initial event that led to 
infection in humans was due to animal-human transmission, this is 
largely irrelevant for addressing an epidemic that primarily spread 
through human-to-human contact.156  
Whatever the biological or ecological origin of the virus in West 
Africa, it was the socio-political and legal landscape that influenced 
whether the virus would lead to a couple of isolated cases or become a 
full-scale outbreak.157 One of the reasons the epidemic was able to 
spread so easily was because of the concentration of people in urban 
areas due to decades of governmental neglect of rural areas as well as 
displacement of many during the conflicts in the sub-region.158 Porous 
borders between the three countries that had historically facilitated 
the transfer of people and goods during the conflict years aided the 
spread of arms, insurgents, and war economies; and during the Ebola 
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outbreak enabled the spread of disease and death. All three countries 
closed their borders with each other attempting to contain the spread 
of the disease. 
During the epidemic, a pattern of transmission from rural to ur-
ban areas eased Ebola’s spread. Emile Ouamouno (“Patient Zero”) is a 
two-year old child who got infected with a mysterious fever that spread 
to his family members, a rural health facility, and then a health 
worker’s funeral, and through related familial, social, and trading net-
works to the Liberian, Guinean, and Sierra Leonean borders.159 This 
trajectory—where an infected person goes to an under-resourced 
health facility without clean needles, a supply of gloves, or other neces-
sities for successful treatment and containment of the disease, render-
ing both the patient and health care providers vulnerable and suscep-
tible to transmission—resulted in the disease inevitably being 
transmitted and the cycle repeated.160 
It took three months for the mysterious fever found in Guinea in 
December 2013 to be confirmed as Ebola in March of 2014.161 Between 
March and May of 2014, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone identified 
hundreds of Ebola cases. At the height of the epidemic, Sierra Leone 
alone was experiencing 250 new cases per week and an epidemic dou-
bling time of approximately thirty days.162 Remarkably, a 2015 
Afrobarometer study indicated that 35.8 percent of Sierra Leoneans 
and 44.8 percent of Liberians surveyed knew a close friend or relative 
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infected with Ebola.163 Tragically, roughly the same percentage of re-
spondents knew someone who died of Ebola: in Sierra Leone approxi-
mately 33.4 percent, and in Liberia 40.8 percent.164 
Moreover, the collateral effects of Ebola were quite dramatic. In-
deed, more than 60 percent of respondents to the Afrobarometer sur-
veys in both Sierra Leone and Liberia indicated that they were unable 
to work several or many times due to Ebola.165 Because of Ebola, the 
tourist and service industries were also depressed in the sub-region.166 
Additionally, the disease reduced agricultural production, which con-
tributed to food prices increasing by an estimated 24 percent across the 
sub-region, leading to fears of malnutrition and famine.167 
 Further, the Ebola epidemic attacked informal networks of care 
by targeting women, who constituted up to 75 percent of those in-
fected.168 These women were the numerous mothers, sisters, daugh-
ters, grandmothers, aunts, wives, and girlfriends who bear primary re-
sponsibility for caregiving work. Informal systems of caregiving 
became particularly salient when the local and international systems 
of health care protection had receded or abandoned Ebola patients. 
Women often functioned as the last line of care. But, the way the dis-
ease is transmitted threatened this, which meant that physical touch 
to comfort and show concern and affection was also off-limits. Ebola 
educational campaigns stressed this—“no hugging, no handshakes, no 
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caring for the ill, and no handling of the dead” in preparation for buri-
als.169 Markets and social places were deserted as government re-
strictions and fears about congregating in public led people to avoid 
many everyday interactions.170 The Afrobarometer survey results in-
dicate that more than 60 percent of respondents in Sierra Leone were 
unable to attend social gatherings several or many times due to 
Ebola.171 As such, the disease impacted much more than physical bod-
ies, striking also at the fabric of social life instilling fear around every-
thing from making love to shaking hands.172 In this way, Ebola not 
only threatened communities of care, but what it means to be human—
challenging how people greet and interact with strangers and loved 
ones and what it means to die with dignity and respect. 
2. Post-Conflict Legacies & the Ebola Epidemic 
Statistically, disease is a more formidable and deadly opponent 
than war.173 Like war, disease has the ability to completely upend gov-
ernments by creating power vacuums, reducing life expectancy and 
concomitantly the available productive workforce and capacity, which 
impedes economic growth, threatens food security, and erodes confi-
dence in government institutions.174 Naturally, the metaphor of con-
flict was employed to describe the fight against Ebola and legacies of 
violence influenced governmental responses.175 Countries declared 
themselves “at war with an enemy we don’t see,” conjuring up images 
of the “invisible rebel.”176 Others drew parallels between how earlier 
insurgencies had come from the border areas to threaten urban areas, 
and how Ebola’s spread in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone followed 
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this same trend.177 Resistance strategies were also eerily similar with 
some Liberian women gathering in all white at the same location they 
used during the conflict to protest and pray for peace. But this time 
they focused their prayers on divine intervention to overcome Ebola.178 
Additionally, Ebola survivors faced several of the same re-integration 
issues as former combatants, due to the myths, stigma, and social os-
tracization that accompanied the disease.179 Both the former combat-
ant and the Ebola survivor had had contact with the unknown and in-
stilled fear and anxiety in people.180 
The governments in the sub-region resorted to war-like and au-
thoritarian tactics including aggressive policing, closed borders, and 
restrictions on people’s movement.181 The security forces in Liberia 
even fired live rounds at people who were attempting to remove the 
barricades from their quarantine in one of Liberia’s largest slum ar-
eas.182 This use of force gave the impression that the Liberian govern-
ment was attacking poor urban dwellers and not the virus. Govern-
ments that have been perceived and experienced by their publics as 
detached for decades were now supposed to be responsible for the pro-
vision of care and relief.183 The governments predictably resorted to 
authoritarian techniques. For example, Sierra Leone’s army reportedly 
cordoned off rural areas where Ebola was present, indiscriminately 
trapping infected and uninfected individuals in and limiting their free-
dom of movement.184 After the looting of a medical ward in Liberia, 
the government instructed the armed forces to “shoot on sight” anyone 
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entering the country from Sierra Leone without proper documenta-
tion.185 That these countries relied heavily on military and policing 
when faced with Ebola is not shocking considering that these institu-
tions were the only relatively strong ones following limited post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
3. Ineffectual Local Responses to Ebola 
The epidemic overwhelmed the governments in the sub-region 
and re-exposed the fragility of the state apparatus. In part, this was 
because post-conflict reconstruction efforts were focused on rebuilding, 
retraining, and integrating disparate groups into the police and the 
military with little to no investment in the health sector. All three 
countries imposed a state of public emergency that combined impacted 
millions of people.186 Sierra Leone declared a national “stay at home 
day” and ordered a three-day lockdown during which time the populace 
was to remain indoors, while outreach workers attempted to identify 
cases, engage in public sensitization, and assist with the removal of 
bodies of Ebola victims.187 In Sierra Leone, the Afrobarometer survey 
results indicate that 50.6 percent of respondents were unable to attend 
school many times due to Ebola.188 Similarly, Guinea closed all schools 
and universities for an indefinite period of time to attempt to halt the 
transmission of the virus.189 
The governments’ conduct in attempting to eradicate Ebola en-
gendered and reinforced deep public suspicion and mistrust of the 
state. For example, many Liberians believed that the Ebola virus was 
a new method the government had concocted to derive money from its 
international backers.190 Early denials of Ebola in Sierra Leone and 
Guinea were similarly influenced by fears that the government was 
trying to rid itself of an opposition stronghold through depopulation of 
particular regions.191 In Guinea, residents’ fear was also partially in-
formed by their experience with noninclusive state socialism under 
post-independence leader Sekou Touré.192 This experience led them to 
                                                                                                                       
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 596–97. 
187 See Asher, supra note 173, at 164. 
188 Afrobarometer 2015 Survey Results, supra note 163, at Q84a-SRL. 
189 See Asher, supra note 173, at 160–61. 
190 See Wilkinson & Leach, supra note 17, at 144. 
191 Id.; Faul, supra note 159. 
192 See Leach, supra note 8, at 827. 
 
35       VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 51:245 
believe that Ebola was a government effort to take over their mar-
kets.193 Others in Guinea suspected that Ebola was designed by white 
mining interests in order to be able to exploit iron ore deposits.194 Sim-
ilar to the commonplace myth with HIV/AIDS, many across the sub-
region also suspected that Ebola was disseminated by Whites in order 
to kill off Blacks.195 These rumors, political myths, and conspiracy the-
ories helped to fill the void and make sense of the mysterious phenom-
ena of Ebola. It would be too simplistic to dismiss these perceptions as 
mere superstition or ignorance. These sentiments stem from people’s 
experience of structural violence and perceptions of state and foreign 
actors as “alien, oppressive, and self-serving.”196 This alien-ness was 
literally reinforced by the “space-suit like” protective gear donned by 
Ebola outbreak teams.197 
 Individual and community-level responses to Ebola cannot be di-
vorced from people’s lived realities. For instance, in Liberia, an uncle 
of a family of young orphans explained that the mother of the children 
contracted Ebola from an aunt who had died, and that the family had 
called the Ministry of Health’s Ebola hotline when the mother began 
showing symptoms.198 No one came from the treatment unit, but a 
burial team came to take her body away when she died. Subsequently, 
the children’s father also became ill with Ebola, and the family again 
called the hotline for days without response.199 When the children’s 
father died, a burial team came a couple of days later to retrieve the 
body. This led the uncle to chase away a health care worker when the 
children began showing early signs of Ebola and to exclaim that the 
Ministry of Health appears to care “more for the dead than the liv-
ing.”200  
 Ebola exposed the façade of the formal health system and demon-
strated quite vividly how much actual health care provision depends 
on the informal system. This was particularly true for those living in 
rural areas, as the distance to get to a health facility is daunting—
especially due to poor roads that are often impassible during the rainy 
season, as well as the need to arrange for private transport.201 Conse-
quently, some people rely on informal drug suppliers and traditional 
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healers because of the paucity of clinics and pharmacies.202 The 
Afrobarometer survey confirms this, with approximately 20–30 per-
cent of respondents in Sierra Leone and Liberia, respectively, finding 
traditional medicine practitioners to be somewhat to very effective in 
providing care for Ebola victims.203 Reliance on the informal system is 
sensible in a context where it is common practice for government offi-
cials and the well-to-do to go overseas to seek medical care in Ghana 
or South Africa, or in Europe and the United States.204 This tendency 
increased during the outbreak, with many sending their families 
abroad if not leaving themselves. 
The informal health system had more legitimacy than the formal 
health system in part because the latter had proved to be deficient in 
a myriad of ways. Treatment facilities did not have enough beds or staff 
to care for the sick across the sub-region.205 Additionally, many clinics 
were forced to close because they became sites of transmission and 
death as opposed to places to receive care. This occurred due to the 
formal health sector’s general lack of personal protective equipment as 
well as “staff, systems and stuff.”206 For example, one of the hospitals 
responsible for the provision of care to 330,000 people in Liberia was 
forced to close due to the lack of personnel to run the hospital.207 The 
Afrobarometer survey results demonstrate that more than 60 percent 
of respondents in Liberia and Sierra Leone believed they were unable 
to get medical care for other health problems several or many times 
due to Ebola.208 This meant that those that were suffering from more 
prevalent and common illnesses like malaria, typhoid, or pneumonia 
were dying in even more alarming numbers because they were unable 
                                                                                                                       
202 See IDS, RETURN OF THE REBEL, supra note 130, at 2. 
203 See Afrobarometer 2015 Survey Results, supra note 163, at Q85c-SRL (11.5% very 
effective and 7.8% somewhat effective for Sierra Leone); see also id. at Q84d-Lib (10.1% 
very effective and 19.6 somewhat effective for Liberia). 
204 See Breen, supra note 176 (“Citizens know that government officials often leave Li-
beria for the United States or Europe to seek medical attention.”). 
205 See Konye Obaji Ori, Liberia: Ebola Threatens Statehood Success, Post-Civil War, 
THE AFR. REP. (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.theafricareport.com/West-Africa/liberia-
ebola-threatens-statehood-success-post-civil-war.html [https://perma.cc/HB2G-QVT2] 
(archived Jan. 21, 2018). 
206 Farmer & Mukherjee, supra note 168. 
207 Hodge et al., supra note 184, at 358. 
208 See Afrobarometer 2015 Survey Results, supra note 163, at Q84d-SRL; Afrobarometer 
2015 Survey Results, supra note 162, at Q84d-Lib. 
 
37       VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 51:245 
to receive proper care.209 Likewise, gains that were made reducing ma-
ternal deaths were being reversed.210  
Thus, instead of the negative individual and community reaction 
towards health care workers and centers symbolizing a rejection of 
Western medicine,211 a more nuanced analysis would situate this 
backlash as a form of resistance against structural violence after dec-
ades of neglect and exploitation. For example, allegations of corruption 
that led to the suspension of donor funds to the Ministry of Health and 
Sanitation in Sierra Leone in 2013 reinforced earlier worries of govern-
mental malfeasance.212 Fears of corruption in Sierra Leone also led 
international accounting firm KPMG to withdraw from the Ebola Fund 
due to questionable management practices.213 These fears were not 
unfounded, with recent audits indicating that fraud by Red Cross 
workers and others wasted at least USD 6 million meant to fight Ebola 
in the sub-region.214  
Accordingly, health care centers were increasingly viewed with 
suspicion, because people were accustomed to fending for themselves 
and were skeptical of their governments’ newfound care and con-
cern.215 The Afrobarometer survey results corroborate this, finding 
that the perceived effectiveness of local private or public hospitals and 
clinics provision of care to Ebola victims is dismal when contrasted 
with the perceived effectiveness of international organizations.216 
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These issues conspired to make the populace view their “health sys-
tem” with derision due either to peoples’ experience with it or inability 
to access it because of economic, logistical, or other constraints.217 
Sadly, only a little more than a third of respondents surveyed by the 
Afrobarometer in Sierra Leone were very confident that their govern-
ment was prepared for a future Ebola outbreak.218 
 The synopsis above is necessary to begin to understand the sub-
region’s extreme vulnerability to crises and why the Ebola epidemic 
had such devastating consequences in this part of the world. This sub-
part analyzed how the ineffectual local governmental responses to 
Ebola resulted in structural violence in all three countries, exacerbat-
ing the adverse consequences of the disease. It seems that the govern-
ments’ affirmative conduct was a substantial factor in producing the 
resulting structural violence in all three countries, the disproportion-
ate risks for infection during the Ebola epidemic, and the associated 
harms. Moreover, the resulting structural violence that occurred fol-
lowing the governmental responses to Ebola was not so remote to ren-
der it unforeseeable to governmental actors. Accordingly, it is fair un-
der the circumstances to hold governmental actors responsible for 
contributing to structural violence committed during the Ebola epi-
demic.  
 But, as other scholars have eloquently put it, “[v]ulnerabilities do 
not just fall from the sky.”219 While undeniably the spread of the Ebola 
epidemic is due to a combination of domestic factors, the tendency has 
been to focus almost exclusively on local actors and factors as a way to 
distance, differentiate, and other the spread of the disease.220 Such 
analyses serve to obscure the functioning of the international system—
as if no institutions or other actors influenced this result through ac-
tions, decision making, laws, policies, and omissions. The next Part 
turns to this unmasking. 
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR HEALTH AND SECURITY & THE 
SPREAD OF EBOLA 
This Part draws attention to international legal and institutional 
frameworks that influence and sustain structural violence. While these 
international processes might be done without malicious design, it is 
important to analyze the role of international law to counteract the 
sense that the way the Ebola epidemic unfolded is demonstrative of 
how bad things “just happen.”221 Failure to interrogate both the role 
of local and international action and inaction relegates us to an unsat-
isfactory world in which diseases like Ebola cannot be overcome or de-
fied—like gravity.  
This Part focuses on the international regimes for health and se-
curity because these regimes’ mandates charge them with responding 
to the Ebola epidemic in varying ways. The WHO’s primary role is to 
direct and coordinate international health within the United Nations’ 
system, while the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) primary 
responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Given their mandates, this Part analyzes what obligations these re-
gimes have to respond to the Ebola epidemic, whether these regimes 
discharged their responsibilities during the epidemic, and, if they 
failed to do so, whether the failure to act was a substantial factor and/or 
an accelerating factor in the resulting structural violence that oc-
curred. Additionally, this Part considers whether it is fair under the 
circumstances to hold the actors within these regimes responsible for 
contributing to structural violence. Finally, this Part analyzes whether 
their responses ex post facto will positively impact the likelihood of sur-
vival from other epidemics.  
A. International Health & the Regulation of Highly Infectious Dis-
eases like Ebola 
The ineffectual role played by the WHO in regulating infectious 
diseases has been well documented elsewhere.222 For example, the 
devastating toll of HIV/AIDS, one of the worst pandemics in history, 
threatened to eclipse the role of the WHO.223 Yet following the WHO’s 
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successful fight against SARS in 2003, members empowered the organ-
ization to declare and manage global public health emergencies. This 
subpart analyzes the emergency powers granted to the WHO under the 
International Health Regulations (IHRs) in 2005224 and examines the 
WHO’s failure to adequately manage the Ebola crisis and to discharge 
its responsibilities. 
1. The WHO’s Emergency Powers 
The World Health Assembly is the governing body for the WHO 
and has significant regulatory powers.225 However, the WHO has 
made limited use of its constitutional powers.226 For example, in 1951 
the International Sanitary Regulations were enacted, which were re-
named the International Health Regulations (IHRs) in 1969 and re-
vised in 2005.227 The IHRs were aimed primarily at controlling com-
municable diseases, although the 2005 revisions expanded the scope of 
health issues covered.228 The basic premise of the system worked via 
notification requirements which would then trigger an international 
response that imposed travel and trade restrictions in order to control 
the spread of certain named diseases like cholera, yellow fever, and the 
plague.229 While the list of diseases expanded over the years, the IHRs 
became mainly superfluous.230 Scholars have demonstrated how in-
creasing flows of trade and travel made quarantine and isolation pro-
visions obsolete, and medical advances like antibiotics and vaccina-
tions required a drastically different approach than those initially 
envisioned by the IHRs.231 
The IHRs of 2005 empower the Director General of the WHO Sec-
retariat, in conjunction with a committee of mostly medical experts, to 
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declare an international state of emergency as well as provide tempo-
rary recommendations once the emergency has been declared.232 They 
also require the Director General to consult with the committee of ex-
perts before deciding whether to terminate an emergency or to modify 
a previously issued recommendation.233 Under the IHRs, all recom-
mendations are to sunset after three months, subject to extensions that 
cannot continue over two years.234 If the Director General wants to 
issue standing recommendations, they must be approved by a plenary 
body of the WHO.235 The WHO’s emergency response is subject to re-
view by an expert committee that can issue a non-binding report.236 
The procedures and framework that are set out in the IHRs pro-
vide only the broad parameters for emergency decision making, and 
they do not determine when an emergency should be declared. Moreo-
ver, the concept of crisis is an inherently political and legal construct 
that allows for the justification of extraordinary power. While the WHO 
is primarily controlled by physicians, scientists, public health special-
ists, and other experts who tend to emphasize a scientific or medical 
approach to addressing public health emergencies, tensions inevitably 
arise because of the essentially legal and political nature of emergen-
cies.237 The WHO is a secretariat that is responsive to member states 
and specifically the ministries of health of different countries, which 
often have varying interests and priorities.238 And powerful states can 
always exert influence because they are more likely to have nationals 
who are WHO experts and personnel.239 
The IHRs of 2005 define a Public Health Emergency of Interna-
tional Concern (PHEIC) broadly as “an extraordinary event, which is 
determined . . . (i) to constitute a public health risk to other States 
through the international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially re-
quire a coordinated international response.”240 Under the regulations, 
the WHO can make wide-ranging recommendations concerning travel 
advice, restrictions on travel in certain regions, quarantines, customs 
restrictions, vaccination protocols, as well as measures relating to food 
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safety.241 While these recommendations are non-binding,242 they 
serve as a baseline for measuring states’ responses to PHEICs to the 
extent they deviate above the recommended actions or below the rec-
ommended actions.243 The main critique of the WHO during the Ebola 
crisis surrounded the organization’s delayed decision making in acti-
vating its emergency powers. The subpart below explores the WHO’s 
lackluster response to Ebola and failure to adequately manage relief 
efforts. 
2. The WHO’s Failure to Manage the Ebola Epidemic 
a. Declaring an Emergency  
Ebola was a litmus test for the WHO’s newly minted emergency 
powers. In 1995, when the Ebola outbreak in the DRC occurred, it was 
not a designated disease for reporting purposes under the then govern-
ing IHRs.244 During the DRC outbreak, the police blocked the road 
leading to the capital city, resulting in the healthy dying along with 
those stricken by Ebola.245 Some commentators have noted that the 
fear and the desire to control an unknown disease concomitant with 
the lack of necessary legal structures and policies in place potentially 
contributed to a greater loss of life than was necessary.246 Tragically, 
almost ten years later a similar pattern of structural violence occurred 
in West Africa. 
Poor communications and complacency within the organization 
resulted in the WHO not convening a regional meeting on the epidemic 
until three months into the outbreak.247 The outbreak in West Africa 
emerged in December 2013,248 and Doctors Without Borders had been 
sounding the alarm since March of 2014 that the scale of the outbreak 
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in West Africa was “unprecedented.”249 Yet it was not until August of 
2014 that the WHO declared Ebola a PHEIC under the IHRs of 2005. 
Moreover, it was only at this point that the WHO unveiled a framework 
for attempting to contain the outbreak.250  
The WHO missed the opportunity to quickly contain Ebola and 
bring the outbreak under control. It initially determined that from a 
numbers perspective, the Ebola outbreak did not rise to the level of 
urgency that warranted declaring a PHEIC, but this approach failed to 
take account of the unique characteristics of the outbreak in the sub-
region.251 The Ebola outbreak in West Africa did not occur in a remote 
area; so for the first time the disease reached a big urban area–Cona-
kry, the capital city of Guinea.252 Also, because suspected cases were 
emerging along the border areas with Sierra Leone and Liberia, it 
would mean having to coordinate the response of three different ad-
ministrations under circumstances where no government would have 
incentive to declare an epidemic on its territory because of the eco-
nomic implications of decreased trade and travel to affected regions.253 
Reportedly, due to Ebola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea suffered 
an estimated USD 2.8 billion in GDP losses (USD 600 million in 
Guinea, USD 300 million in Liberia, and USD 1.9 billion in Sierra Le-
one).254 Most critically, the outbreak was occurring where already 
damaged health care systems had suffered cumulative effects from un-
derdevelopment, years of governmental neglect, structural adjustment 
policies, conflict, and narrow post-conflict reconstruction, which could 
lead to catastrophic consequences if the disease was not contained 
properly.255 
In the face of increasing political pressure, the WHO seized on the 
fact that someone with Ebola traveled on an international flight as an 
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opportunity to revise its initial conservative stance toward the dis-
ease.256 Yet this event—in which someone from Liberia who was in-
fected with Ebola traveled to Nigeria—can hardly be viewed as the 
seminal event in the disease’s trajectory that the WHO purported it 
was.257 This is because the epidemic was already international in na-
ture and the PHEIC should have been declared earlier. Certainly, the 
disease had already traveled across borders to upend things in three 
countries.258 The possibility of the disease spreading via air travel was 
always present.259 Yet earlier transmission via foot in the sub-region 
was apparently not sufficient to transform concern about Ebola into a 
crisis warranting international coordination and decisive action. The 
fear of transmission via plane was exemplified in the case of Thomas 
Eric Duncan who arrived in Dallas, Texas from Liberia and caused sig-
nificant consternation in the United States.260 The screening, testing, 
and surveillance measures that were imposed at airports in the sub-
region were ineffectual. This is in part due to the incubation period of 
the disease wherein an infected person could appear asymptomatic, 
which appears to be what happened with Mr. Duncan. His case further 
crystalized fears that the disease would not remain localized in “Af-
rica,” but that it might impact countries in the Global North. In this 
manner, the fear of contact with the Global North transformed Ebola 
from an unfortunate situation in a “backward” region to a public health 
emergency of international concern. 
Despite the WHO’s recommendations to the contrary, several 
states imposed travel bans and trade restrictions on the Ebola affected 
countries.261 This exacerbated already dire conditions and limited the 
ability of relief and aid efforts to stem the spread of the epidemic 
thereby contributing to structural violence. For example, Australia and 
Canada announced travel restrictions on entry from residents of the 
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Ebola affected countries.262 An independent review panel recom-
mended that in the future the IHRs be revised such that sanctions can 
be imposed on countries that take measures beyond the WHO’s recom-
mendations.263  
The WHO was largely a bystander while more community-driven 
strategies for disease containment helped to stop the spread of the dis-
ease. Notably, a significant number of respondents in the Afrobarome-
ter survey perceived the treatment facilities of local NGOs to be very 
effective in responding to Ebola.264 For example, Sierra Leone and Li-
beria utilized community care centers because individuals suspected of 
having Ebola had to rely on informal networks of care, which put other 
household members at high risk of infection.265 These centers were de-
signed to assist with isolating and providing care for people suspected 
of having Ebola who had limited access to formal treatment facilities 
due to a lack of available beds.266  
Between March and June of 2016, the WHO declared the end of 
the PHEIC for Ebola in the affected countries—forty-two days after the 
last person tested positive for the disease.267 The WHO warned the 
affected countries to maintain heightened surveillance given the risks 
of flare-ups and challenges with bringing Ebola completely to heel.268 
The WHO, with the benefit of hindsight, has recognized that it bungled 
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the response to Ebola.269 The WHO’s omission likely led to greater ill-
ness and death than would otherwise have resulted if the WHO had 
acted much earlier. Accordingly, the WHO’s failure to timely act was a 
substantial factor in the resulting structural violence that occurred 
during the Ebola epidemic. Moreover, the WHO’s failure to act in a 
timely fashion frustrated a more effective response to the Ebola epi-
demic. The structural violence that occurred because of the WHO’s in-
action during the Ebola epidemic was not too accidental in its occur-
rence to have a just bearing on the WHO’s responsibility. 
b. Explanations for the Botched Response  
Many explanations have emerged to account for the WHO’s fail-
ure to properly discharge its obligations in the face of Ebola. Prior to 
the Ebola epidemic, the WHO had only issued a PHEIC two other times 
since its inception: once for the Swine Flu epidemic in April 2009, and 
again for the resurgence of polio in May of 2014. Some commentators 
have pointed to the WHO’s hesitance in declaring a PHEIC with Ebola 
due to the stinging criticism it faced for overhyping Swine Flu.270 
Additionally, the organization identified its institutional culture 
and politics as hindering its response to Ebola.271 For instance, the 
WHO has increasingly become a technocratic organization as opposed 
to one responsible for ensuring global public health.272 It suffers from 
politicization and intra-organization challenges between headquarters 
in Geneva and regional and country offices.273 For example, some com-
mentators have faulted African regional personnel for lacking tech-
nical knowledge and expertise as well as independence.274 These indi-
viduals appeared to be captured by political interests, which resulted 
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in contradictory communications from the regional offices and at times 
downplayed the severity of Ebola.275 
Moreover, WHO personnel initially did not recognize the reality 
that basic and essential medical supplies were lacking in the affected 
countries.276 For example, nurses in Liberia were cutting up old uni-
forms to protect their faces when working with Ebola patients.277 This 
disconnect had dire consequences on the ground with an estimated 512 
health care workers dying due to lack of adequate protective gear while 
combatting Ebola in the sub-region.278 Reportedly, more than 10 per-
cent of deaths from Ebola were of health care workers, who the affected 
countries could not afford to see die before their time.279 The increased 
risk for health care workers resulted in strikes with the workers de-
manding increased pay for treating Ebola cases, as well as more pro-
tective equipment and insurance.280 Yet health care workers were not 
the only ones impacted. As discussed in Part II, the disease threatened 
systems of social and communal care. However, because structurally 
the WHO is not equipped to carry out field level support and the Ge-
neva-based technocrats had little logistical experience working in West 
Africa, the institution responsible for formulating the global response 
to the Ebola epidemic was disconnected from the realities on the 
ground.281  
Moreover, the WHO had notice about widespread unprepared-
ness. The IHRs of 2005 require that state parties develop, strengthen, 
and maintain their capacity to “respond promptly and effectively to 
public health risks and public health emergencies of international con-
cern.”282 Under Article 54 of the IHRs, countries are to annually self-
report their implementation status to the World Health Assembly.283 
Countries are required to develop, strengthen, and maintain the capac-
ity to “detect, assess, notify and report events” under the IHRs.284 Yet 
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in 2009, an Independent Review Committee warned the WHO follow-
ing the H1N1 influenza outbreak that the world was “ill-prepared to 
respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly global, sus-
tained and threatening public health emergency.”285 It also found that 
health capacities were nowhere near “a timely path to implementation 
worldwide.”286 Further, capacity deficits are especially acute in many 
developing countries.287 The lack of capacity in many states in the 
Global South is in part due to historical vulnerability from slavery, co-
lonialism, neocolonialism, bad governance, and neoliberal reform poli-
cies like structural adjustment. Accordingly, in 2013 prior to the Ebola 
outbreak, no African state had fully implemented the IHRs core capac-
ity requirements.288 And these gaps in core capacities were especially 
pronounced in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone because, concomitant 
with the structural factors discussed above, the sub-region had a recent 
history of conflicts and narrow post-conflict reconstruction, which cu-
mulatively hollowed out the health sector. Ebola was occurring in a 
region with severely compromised health systems and with states that 
lacked the capacity to prevent the domestic and transnational spread 
of the disease.289 The WHO apparently recognized this vulnerability 
when it eventually declared a PHEIC for Ebola. Margaret Chan, Direc-
tor-General of the WHO asserted that the countries affected by the ep-
idemic “simply do not have the capacity to manage an outbreak of this 
size and complexity on their own” and urged the international commu-
nity to provide support.290   
However, the financial crisis had recently hit global markets and 
left the WHO on precarious footing to respond to emergencies as it was 
severely understaffed and underfinanced.291 For example, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and some European governments reduced 
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contributions to WHO, due not only to austerity, but also to their belief 
that the organization needed to engage in essential reforms.292 As 
such, it was forced to go through dramatic restructuring following the 
financial crisis in order to streamline its operations in line with the 
reduced contributions it faced.293 For example, in 2011 the organiza-
tion lost USD 1 billion in funding from core areas and had to cut 300 
jobs.294 One of the main areas that was hit by these shifts was the 
WHO’s emergency response. Remarkably, the outbreak response team 
was dismantled as the organization shifted priorities away from com-
municable diseases and hemorrhagic fevers—resulting in a significant 
loss of institutional memory.295  
The WHO was already on notice that its budget could not be easily 
repurposed for emergency use.296 The WHO reportedly only controls a 
mere 30 percent of its budget,297 and its funders have competing pri-
orities. For example, private foundations wield significant influence 
over WHO decision making due to their substantial contributions.298 
The WHO experienced budgetary limitations when the SARS outbreak 
began in China and spread worldwide, resulting in the deaths of some 
775 people.299 SARS occurred approximately a decade before Ebola, 
and the WHO needed to secure extra funding to fight it.300 Despite this 
circumstance, it was not a wake-up call for the WHO. The WHO 
pointed to indifference at the international level, which further im-
peded its ability to effectively fight Ebola.301 This was evident when 
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the United Nations created the Ebola Relief Fund,302 as there were a 
paltry number of initial donations dedicated to it.303  
 A Review Committee prior to the Ebola outbreak had recom-
mended that the WHO create a rapid-response emergency fund.304 The 
demand for dedicated funds for public health emergencies was essen-
tially ignored as the WHO’s 2014–2015 budget for health crises was a 
mere USD 228 million for the entire world—half of what had been al-
located the previous year.305 By way of comparison, the WHO’s budget 
is only a third of the operating budget of the United States’ Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) even though the WHO’s work 
is far more expansive than just dealing with infectious diseases.306 
Consequently, severe underfinancing of the WHO created ripe condi-
tions for devastating consequences that would accompany the Ebola 
epidemic. The WHO had misplaced faith in its ability to quickly secure 
funds in the event of an emergency and this lead to structural violence 
during its response to Ebola.307 
c. Responding to Failure 
 The WHO approximates that it needs more than 30 percent of its 
budget to come from mandatory contributions for it to function at full 
capacity.308 This would enable the organization to be nimbler and have 
a reliable source of funding to respond to epidemics like Ebola. Accord-
ingly, the WHO proposed a 5 percent increase of member states’ man-
datory contributions to it, but this proposal was rejected by the World 
Health Assembly.309 Instead, after the Ebola epidemic, the World 
Health Assembly approved the creation of a Contingency Fund for 
Emergencies (CFE) in May 2015.  
 The CFE is supposed to provide the resources necessary to scale 
up the initial response to outbreaks by funding the first three 
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months.310 The WHO contends that the CFE will enable it to deploy 
its experts as well as other stakeholders311 to work in areas where ep-
idemics are burgeoning.312 The CFE is part of the WHO’s effort to im-
prove the way that it responds to epidemics, and it falls under the or-
ganization’s new unified Emergency Program. The WHO anticipates 
that the CFE will assist with alleviating suffering, providing medical 
care to those in need, enabling preparedness and surveillance in sur-
rounding areas at high risk, and addressing factors that could lead to 
escalation of an emergency.313 The CFE is financed through voluntary 
contributions, with a capitalization target of USD 100 million.314 As of 
February 2017, states contributed only approximately USD 33 million 
towards this goal.315 The sustainability of the CFE given this critical 
funding gap is likely to remain a crucial issue moving forward.316  
 The CFE shows little promise of reducing the incidence of epidem-
ics and avoidable deaths from infectious diseases like Ebola in vulner-
able countries. The CFE is a reactionary mechanism. The CFE does 
not prioritize building horizontal capacity across the health sector, and 
the WHO does not have other funding dedicated to the horizontal de-
velopment of strong domestic health systems317 to assist with prepar-
edness and prevention. As currently designed, the CFE is a stop–gap 
measure that does not address the root causes of structural violence 
witnessed with the Ebola epidemic and effectively ignores global health 
inequities in state capacities. Since the WHO contributed to the struc-
tural violence witnessed, its response needs to do more to mitigate the 
harm caused.  
 Moreover, when states fail to meet the capacity requirements of 
the IHRs, the WHO does not provide sticks or carrots to assist with 
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compliance.318 Yet sanctions as a means of dealing with structural vi-
olence that was in part facilitated by global actors seems particularly 
inappropriate for addressing global health inequities in capacities. The 
harm likely caused by the economic consequences of sanctions concom-
itant with the socioeconomic impact of the epidemic would frustrate 
the affected state’s ability to recover.319 And economic isolation would 
only exacerbate the problems of countries with PHEICs in attempting 
to marshal resources to provide treatment and to prevent infectious 
diseases from spreading further.320 Such measures would likely prove 
counterproductive and increase tensions at a time when greater inter-
national cooperation is needed to combat disease.321 
 As such, the IHRs should be reformed to provide for greater car-
rots for states to comply voluntarily with core capacity requirements. 
This could take the form of capacity building (research and information 
sharing), technical assistance (training and the provision of expertise), 
and financial and material assistance, especially where states lack the 
infrastructure necessary to address epidemics like Ebola domestically. 
Rather than leaving states solely responsible for addressing health in-
equities that exist in part because of the functioning of the interna-
tional system, this approach would potentially broaden the involve-
ment and cooperation of international actors in addressing highly 
infectious diseases.  
 This subpart has demonstrated how the global public health re-
gime facilitated structural violence and influenced the global inequities 
in the distribution of infectious diseases like Ebola. The delayed and 
fragmented response to Ebola exposed the weakness and fragility of 
the global public health architecture.322 It also had real consequences 
on the likely increased incidence of illness and death that resulted from 
the inadequate international response in the Ebola-affected countries. 
Under these circumstances, it is fair to find the actors within this re-
gime responsible for contributing to structural violence witnessed dur-
ing the Ebola epidemic. Specifically, the WHO failed to appropriately 
discharge its responsibilities, and its failure to do so was a substantial 
factor in the resulting structural violence. The result also cannot be 
considered too remote to have a just bearing on the WHO’s responsibil-
ity. Moreover, the ex ante failure in the international global health re-
gime significantly influenced the course of the Ebola epidemic. Finally, 
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the organization’s ex post facto efforts to mitigate the harm caused by 
structural violence for future epidemics is not robust enough.  
C. International Security & the Regulation of Highly Infectious Dis-
eases like Ebola 
 Applying the framework of structural violence to the international 
peace and security regime would necessitate the UNSC having a more 
expansive interpretation of security. Human security seeks to draw at-
tention to the multitude of threats that cut across different aspects of 
human life including health and related challenges.323 It seeks to uti-
lize an integrated, coordinated, and people-centered approach to ad-
vance peace, security, and development within and across nations.324 
The prioritization of human security is not without its critics, but the 
relevance of it is clear, because the security of the individual directly 
impacts the security of the state, and this has strong implications for 
international peace and security and global public health.325 In other 
words, structural violence and human security as organizing principles 
enable things other than “guns and boots on the ground” to be consid-
ered threats to international peace and security, thus warranting an 
international response. 
 This subpart uses these concepts to analyze whether the actors 
within the peace and security regime discharged their responsibilities, 
and if they failed to do so, whether the failure to act was a substantial 
factor and/or an accelerating factor in the resulting structural violence 
that occurred. This subpart evaluates whether it is fair under the cir-
cumstances to hold the actors within this regime responsible for con-
tributing to structural violence witnessed during the Ebola epidemic. 
Lastly, it assesses the organization’s ex post facto efforts to mitigate 
the harm caused by structural violence. 
1. United Nations’ Emergency Powers 
Article 24 of the U.N. Charter confers on the UNSC “primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” 
on behalf of all UN member states.326 The UNSC has fifteen members, 
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five of which are permanent members (the P5).327 The ten rotating, 
non-permanent members represent different regions of the world.328 
UNSC resolutions require the affirmative vote of at least nine mem-
bers and the “concurring votes” of the P5.329 Yet unlike the WHO, 
which can only issue non-binding recommendations, the UNSC has the 
power to create binding resolutions on all other member states of the 
United Nations.330 The UNSC can take a number of binding measures 
to restore international peace and security including authorizing the 
use of force and a wide range of actions that do not involve force, such 
as economic sanctions.331   
In contrast, the General Assembly (GA) is the main deliberative, 
policymaking, and representative organ of the United Nations. Each 
country has a vote, and decisions on important questions, like peace 
and security, require a two-thirds majority, while decisions on other 
questions require a simple majority. Under the Charter, the GA can 
consider and discuss issues pertaining to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, but the GA is only empowered to make non-
binding recommendations to the UNSC or member states.332 Moreo-
ver, where the UNSC is exercising its jurisdiction over a situation, the 
GA is barred from making any recommendations pertaining to that sit-
uation unless the UNSC requests it.333 
 Like the WHO, the procedures and framework that are set out in 
the U.N. Charter provide only the broad framework for emergency de-
cision making. The provisions in the Charter do not determine when a 
threat to international peace and security should be declared. As dis-
cussed above, the concept of crisis is an inherently political and legal 
construct, which justifies extraordinary power. Unlike the WHO, 
which is primarily controlled by medical experts,334 the UNSC is an 
overtly political body, which is tasked with determining an essentially 
legal and political question. 
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 The UNSC historically has prioritized abuses involving direct 
physical violence.335 The UNSC has generally waited until mass phys-
ical violence reached “crisis point” and has traditionally shied away 
from addressing or even discussing the underlying structural causes of 
vulnerability.336 Under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, the UNSC is 
responsible for determining “the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommenda-
tions, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”337 This Article has been interpreted 
quite restrictively, as the Council is not empowered to take enforce-
ment action whenever it desires, and states have vigorously debated 
what actions fall under a “threat to the peace.”338  
 Historically, this has been limited to only acts or threats of physi-
cal violence. For example, the UNSC has been very active in West Af-
rica, passing numerous resolutions relating to the conflicts and post-
conflict peace building in Liberia339 and Sierra Leone.340 Part II de-
tailed the ways in which the United Nations and other international 
actors voluntarily assumed care and functioned as the de facto govern-
ment during post-conflict reconstruction. Concomitantly, the United 
Nations has also engaged in limited post-conflict reconstruction, which 
ignored issues of structural violence and enabled highly infectious dis-
eases like Ebola to spread in the sub-region.  
2. International Peace and Security Regime’s Response to Ebola 
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This subpart considers whether the peace and security regime dis-
charged its responsibilities during the Ebola epidemic by examining 
the response of the UNSC, GA, regional organizations, and individual 
states. 
 
a. United Nations Security Council  
 
 Despite periodic efforts to get the Council to prioritize issues that 
lead to human insecurity, for the most part these efforts have been un-
successful, and the Council has adopted a conservative interpretation 
of what rises to the level of a “threat to the peace.”341 For example, it 
took twenty years of the HIV/AIDS epidemic ravaging sub-Saharan Af-
rica before the Security Council even met to discuss the disease.342 The 
HIV/AIDS epidemic marked the first time that the UNSC issued a res-
olution on a global public health matter.343 During the lead up to the 
UNSC vote on the resolution, Al Gore (then US Vice President) gave a 
speech where he noted that AIDS was a “global aggressor,” a “threat to 
international peace and security.”344 He encouraged the UNSC to ex-
pand its agenda to include security threats from diseases that result in 
“constant fear and degradation . . . [and] loss of the quality of life and 
liberty of spirit that should belong to all.”345 
 Yet it was not until the Ebola epidemic had reached its peak near 
the end of 2014 that the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2177, 
which states “that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in 
Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”346 The 
UNSC Resolution called on states to provide assistance to the affected 
states and to lift travel restrictions that isolated the sub-region, and it 
called on the WHO to accelerate its response.347 The UNSC urged 
member states “to mobilize and provide immediately technical exper-
                                                                                                                       
341 See Hood, supra note 336, at 36. 
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tise and additional medical capacity [. . .] and to provide essential re-
sources, supplies and coordinated assistance to the affected countries 
and implementing partners.”348  
 Remarkably, the Resolution also encouraged Liberia, Sierra Le-
one, and Guinea to establish better functioning health systems,349 as 
if this could be accomplished simply by UNSC fiat. Moreover, the Res-
olution essentially ignored the fact that the United Nations and other 
international actors were in many respects responsible for managing 
and assisting with rebuilding the state following the conflicts in the 
sub-region. The large peace-keeping and peace-building missions that 
the United Nations operated prior to, during, and after the Ebola out-
break in Liberia350 and prior to the outbreak in Sierra Leone351 con-
tributed to the undermining of state capacity in the health sector due 
to a restricted mandate that prioritized responding to direct physical 
violence.352 Narrow post-conflict reconstruction was at least a sub-
stantial factor in aggravating or accelerating the harm caused by the 
Ebola epidemic because it reduced the likelihood of resilient health sys-
tems that could appropriately respond to pandemics. As discussed in 
Part II, this resulted in structural violence with differing risks for in-
fection in the impacted countries during the Ebola epidemic, and—
among those already infected—serious adverse consequences.  
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 One hundred thirty states sponsored Resolution 2177,353 which is 
the highest number of states to ever sponsor a UNSC resolution.354 
The historic level of support for this Resolution is only curious if con-
sidered when removed from the decades long UN efforts at state build-
ing in the sub-region. Indeed, UNSC resolutions have traditionally not 
extended to diseases. This includes ailments like malaria, which kills 
far more people per year than Ebola had by the time the UNSC issued 
Resolution 2177.355   
 States expressed varying rationales when providing explanations 
for their support of Resolution 2177. Some states evidenced a more tra-
ditional understanding of a “threat to peace” by explicitly linking the 
Ebola outbreak to the prospect of future physical violence. For exam-
ple, France’s representative indicated that Ebola was “threatening to 
erase the peace dividends and to reignite chaos” in the affected coun-
tries.356 In this way, Ebola was a “threat to peace” because it was oc-
curring in post-conflict states, whose peace-building efforts might be 
undermined due to the instability the disease was causing.357 Other 
states like Chad did not specifically have a conflict nexus in their ra-
tionale, but representatives contended that the economic and social in-
stability engendered by the disease within the affected countries and 
West Africa more generally posed a threat to peace.358 
 Moreover, many states alluded to the effects Ebola was having on 
individuals and remarked on the large number of people killed by the 
disease and its potential to kill even more.359 For instance, Nicara-
gua’s representative stated that “the international community must 
act immediately with the aim of saving as many human lives as possi-
ble and prevent the current situation from becoming a humanitarian 
catastrophe.”360 Other states emphasized the toll in terms of not only 
deaths, but also the impact on individuals—China’s representative ob-
served that the disease was “seriously threatening the health and life 
of [affected] populations.”361 A few states expressed concern over the 
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collateral effects of the Ebola outbreak. For example, the representa-
tive from the Netherlands remarked, “[I]f we do not act now, people not 
dying of Ebola may die of starvation.”362 Still, others considered the 
psychological effect of the disease on people, with Burundi’s repre-
sentative commenting that the “widespread panic created by the Ebola 
crisis in affected countries does not allow people to go about their nor-
mal daily productive activities.”363 Representatives from other states, 
like Australia and Luxembourg, were of the view that Ebola was a 
“multi-dimensional crisis” that self-evidently “threatened interna-
tional peace and security.”364 
 Some states implicitly relied on a conceptualization of Ebola as 
structural violence, which threatened human security and conse-
quently constituted a threat to the peace. This was reflected in the 
statements of numerous states’ representatives. For example, Argen-
tina’s representative noted that Ebola was “eroding the possibilities of 
human social and economic development, which is at the root of most 
of the conflicts we deal with in this Council, and which may have con-
sequences for security.”365 Others also implicitly expressed the need to 
address structural violence that leads to human insecurity. An illus-
tration of this is the representative from China’s statement that the 
“international community should address both the root causes and 
symptoms of the problems by assisting African countries in accelerat-
ing their economic and social development.”366 Similarly, Luxem-
bourg’s representative admonished that “[w]e must face up to the 
structural challenges that condemn the greater part of the citizens of 
West Africa to live in poverty and precarity and that increase their 
vulnerability to shocks such as the Ebola epidemic.”367 
 While most accounts were not completely divorced from more tra-
ditional security rationales for justifying UNSC action, these state-
ments are still noteworthy because they indicate an implicit acknowl-
edgement of structural violence and its relationship to human security. 
The implicit conceptualization of Ebola as a form of structural violence, 
which threatened human security and warranted an international re-
sponse, was not uniformly held. States like Colombia and Brazil pre-
ferred for the Ebola outbreak in West Africa to be understood as a “cri-
sis,” but not one that rose to the level of threatening international 
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peace and security in general.368 Notwithstanding this, during the de-
bates leading up to the Resolution, many states like South Korea 
viewed the United Nations as the best platform to coordinate ef-
forts.369 Similarly, Russia’s representative observed that the chal-
lenges faced by the affected states required the “coordinated response 
of the international community” and that the Council’s discussion and 
adoption of the Resolution was justified.370 
 While the UNSC’s Resolution 2177 did not alter the legal meaning 
of a “threat to the peace” on its own, it indicates that states are making 
implicit, if not explicit, connections between global public health and 
security. Yet it may seem hollow or empty that the bulk of the analysis 
above examined the rhetoric of states’ representatives in the debates 
surrounding Resolution 2177. This is particularly so when one consid-
ers that following Resolution 2177, after states declared Ebola a 
“threat to international peace,” they decided not to take any enforce-
ment actions.371   
 When faced with threats to international peace and security, the 
UNSC generally has used three tools to change state behavior—mili-
tary action, sanctions, and political leadership.372 The tool most com-
monly used by the UNSC is the imposition of sanctions.373 Yet this 
might lead to more damaging socioeconomic consequences, which 
would not necessarily contain the spread of Ebola or other diseases, 
and would likely exacerbate structural violence.374 Similarly, the au-
thorization of the use of force would be highly inappropriate for dealing 
with infectious diseases and likely would aggravate direct and struc-
tural violence. Changing the underlying structures, institutions, laws, 
and policies that facilitate structural violence would not be furthered 
by allowing for military intervention, which may worsen the conditions 
that led to increased rates of mortality and illness from infectious dis-
eases amongst others. Yet there is no limiting principle that would pre-
vent the UNSC from utilizing one of these unsuitable means of inter-
vening in a public health emergency. 
 Accordingly, the UNSC’s more expansive understanding of secu-
rity must be approached with trepidation. For example, some view the 
Council as superfluous—adding an “unhelpful layer of bureaucracy” 
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and providing no new resources to international efforts to fight infec-
tious diseases.375 Further, some contend that public health is essen-
tially a domestic concern, which should remain exclusively in the juris-
diction of the relevant states.376 Moreover, because the international 
community has not been able to successfully deal with problems of di-
rect mass personal violence,377 there is alarm that it will be even less 
equipped and willing to address problems of structural violence pre-
sented by infectious diseases like Ebola.  
 Further, the UNSC could potentially abuse its newfound power. 
The UNSC’s overt political nature means that it might allow for sover-
eignty incursions, regardless of whether states in the Global South ac-
tually want or need health assistance, and there could be pretextual 
interventions.378 For example, the UNSC could improperly exceed its 
mandate and potentially violate respect for state sovereignty and na-
tional autonomy.379 This could reify geopolitical hierarchies with P5 
members exercising oversight of global public health programs aimed 
at infectious diseases over less powerful regions, and immunize P5 na-
tions and their allies from such health interventions. 
 These reservations are not frivolous given how the UNSC has op-
erated in instances of direct violence. For example, NATO engaged in 
regime change in Libya when implementing the UNSC authorization 
for use of force, which only contemplated the protection of civilians.380 
Further, a fundamental concern with UNSC action is that it allows for 
selectivity based on power politics, with interventions taking place in 
Libya, for example, but none in Syria,381 which is similar or perhaps 
even worse at the time of writing than things were before the interna-
tional community’s intervention in Libya. In the same way that action 
at the level of the UNSC is stalled due to the inability to form consen-
sus amongst the P5 members on tougher measures in Syria, a threat-
ened veto could forestall greater responsiveness to structural violence 
witnessed with other epidemics. As such, equally or perhaps even more 
devastating situations of structural violence may be unaddressed while 
more low hanging fruit are prioritized internationally. The potentially 
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selective enforcement by the UNSC is a precarious method for prevent-
ing the spread of epidemics internationally. Given the above consider-
ations, perhaps the most effective role for the UNSC in combatting in-
fectious diseases is applying varying levels of political leadership and 
pressure to encourage further cooperation from states.382  
 In sum, this subpart has illustrated how the UNSC contributed to 
structural violence through an initial narrow framing of what consti-
tutes a “threat to international peace and security.” This unduly strict 
definition of crises historically perpetuated structural violence and as-
sisted highly infectious diseases to spread, because it prioritized re-
sponding to direct violence above all else. In this way, the UNSC helped 
to create the conditions for structural violence witnessed with the 
Ebola epidemic through a post-conflict reconstruction that neglected 
the health sector. Accordingly, while the regime’s response during the 
epidemic was more robust than it had been for any other disease, this 
does not absolve it of responsibility for failing to recognize and respond 
to the complex relationship between conflict and disease originally.  
b. United Nations General Assembly  
 In contrast to the UNSC, the GA has been much more willing to 
prioritize issues that lead to structural violence. For example, in 2000 
the GA adopted the Millennium Declaration and in 2015 the Sustain-
able Development Goals, which reflect a commitment to address issues 
of both direct and structural violence.383 The GA’s Resolution on Ebola 
69/1 referenced the earlier SC resolution that had determined that 
Ebola was a “threat to peace” and called on “Member States, relevant 
United Nations bodies and the United Nations system to provide their 
full support to the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Re-
sponse.”384    
 The GA’s Resolution 69/1 also requested the Secretary General to 
establish the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response 
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(UNMEER).385 UNMEER was an attempt to coordinate the UN re-
sponse to the epidemic through a unified structure.386 The humanitar-
ian mission reported directly to the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, 
formally solidifying the connection between global public health and 
international peace and security. The GA created the mission in part 
because of the WHO’s bungling of the initial response and the leader-
ship vacuum this created,387 but also because of its own failed post-
conflict reconstruction.  
 UNMEER was the institution’s first ever emergency health mis-
sion and the first system-wide mission of the United Nations. It was 
launched on September 19, 2014 and closed on July 31, 2015. Its pri-
mary objective was to contain and prevent the spread of Ebola through 
case management and safe burial services, to treat infected individu-
als, and to provide services to affected communities.388 The organiza-
tion touts the initiative as having achieved its objective of scaling up 
the response to Ebola on the ground.389 Certainly, UNMEER’s mobili-
zation far exceeded that of the WHO, with approximately USD 19 mil-
lion.390 The United Nations has lauded the health mission as an inno-
vative approach, which will likely increase “as the nature of global 
responses are reshaped to meet the complex challenges of this cen-
tury.”391 Yet this only serves to highlight the fact that the United Na-
tions’ prior peacekeeping missions in the sub-region had essentially ig-
nored the importance of health and the particular risk posed by 
epidemics for fragile states, especially those recovering from a recent 
history of conflict. 
 UNMEER was established during an ongoing crisis, with no priors 
to refer to for guidelines. For example, many humanitarian organiza-
tions were used to working with the United Nations’ previously estab-
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lished global public health institutions, which led to coordination prob-
lems with UNMEER.392 Further, UNMEER prioritized providing hu-
manitarian relief through the delivery and transportation of quantities 
of food instead of desperately needed medical supplies.393 These logis-
tical difficulties solidified the view amongst some that other bodies are 
more well-suited to combatting diseases.  
 Notwithstanding these logistical challenges, the issues faced are 
not insurmountable for future humanitarian health missions, espe-
cially where things are stalled at the level of the UNSC. In the past, 
the GA has sought to empower itself to act in the event of UNSC pa-
ralysis through its Uniting for Peace Resolution. Under this resolution, 
the GA resolved that if the UNSC has failed to exercise its primary 
responsibility for international peace and security where there appears 
to be a threat to or breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, the 
Assembly could recommend collective measures to member states to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.394 The Uniting 
for Peace Resolution has been used sparingly in practice and has only 
been considered legally well-founded where such recommendations are 
made in the context of the Assembly calling on member states to sup-
port the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Ar-
ticle 51 of the Charter.395 Otherwise, the use of the Resolution has 
been controversial in the use of force context because of its encroach-
ment on the Council’s exclusive power to maintain international peace 
and security. 
 Nonetheless, there is some potential for the Assembly to make rec-
ommendations under the Uniting for Peace framework for collective 
measures in the face of threats posed by epidemics, and in many re-
spects GA action would be preferable to UNSC action since there is less 
prospect of the use of blunt measures like sanctions or military inter-
ventions. Under the Charter, the GA is empowered to make non-bind-
ing recommendations for promoting international cooperation in the 
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health field and assisting in the realization of human rights amongst 
others.396 Further, the GA is authorized under the Charter to draw the 
UNSC’s attention to threats that are likely to endanger international 
peace and security.397 A GA resolution expressing that a particular 
epidemic is an emerging “threat to international peace and security” 
and encouraging member states to provide resources to alleviate the 
crisis or to help slow the spread of the disease could be politically in-
fluential for responding to infectious diseases. This could serve as an 
important signal of the seriousness with which an epidemic is re-
garded. As this is still unchartered territory, it is not yet clear whether 
there is an element of Ebola exceptionalism, or whether state practice 
in the GA will develop to recognize other infectious diseases as emerg-
ing threats to international peace and security. 
c. Regional Organizations 
 An alternative way to circumvent UNSC paralysis with address-
ing structural violence presented by epidemics is to allow regional or-
ganizations like the African Union (AU)398 to act.399 During the Ebola 
epidemic, the AU held its first meeting about the outbreak early on in 
April 2014. It appealed to states with prior experience combatting the 
epidemic for support. In August 2014, the AU created the Support to 
Ebola in West Africa (ASEOWA) initiative, which was a military and 
civilian humanitarian mission with the objective of contributing “to the 
ongoing efforts of the national and international community to stop the 
Ebola transmission in the affected member states, prevent interna-
tional spread and rebuild health systems.”400 Notably, UNMEER was 
formed a month after the AU’s ASEOWA initiative. The AU released 
USD 1 million from the Special Emergency Fund for Drought and Fam-
ine to be dedicated to Ebola relief efforts.401 This was combined with 
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donations from the African private sector amounting to USD 15 mil-
lion.402 At the peak of the epidemic, the AU reportedly deployed more 
than 835 African health workers to the affected countries.403 ASEOWA 
team members ran Ebola treatment units and helped with community 
mobilization, they followed up on 49,493 people through contact trac-
ing and provided training to 6,505 local health workers, partners, com-
munity workers, traditional leaders, and others.404 ASEOWA also as-
sisted with the restoration of health services in eighty-eight public 
clinics and hospitals.405 
 Unlike the Americas, the African Continent did not have a func-
tioning regional body dedicated to health at the time of the Ebola epi-
demic. Likely influenced by the regional embarrassment of having the 
United States set up a central command center in Liberia in 2014 to 
spearhead relief efforts,406 the AU created the Africa Center for Dis-
ease Control (African CDC). The Heads of State of the AU approved 
the African CDC in January 2015 to improve prevention, detection, 
and response to public health threats.407 The AU Assembly approved 
the statute of the African CDC in January 2016 and is in the process 
of operationalizing this new institution.408 As this is a new organiza-
tion, it is not yet clear how it will impact epidemics that affect the re-
gion, or whether other regions will adopt similar organizations. 
d. Individual States  
 In the absence of a robust and well-funded international regime 
for responding to public health emergencies caused by infectious dis-
eases like Ebola, states intervened individually only when their secu-
rity interests were directly threatened.409 For example, a few countries 
like Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire closed their borders during the epi-
demic,410 which frustrated humanitarian and aid relief efforts given 
that they serve as regional hubs for flights to and from the sub-region. 
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Solidarity from across the continent with the affected countries was 
initially lacking, as many countries sought to distance and differenti-
ate themselves from the Ebola-affected countries out of fears of de-
pressing tourism and their economies more generally. During the epi-
demic, the countries most affected by Ebola relied predominantly on 
neo-colonial ties with the United States providing support in Liberia (a 
country it helped to create), and the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone 
and France in Guinea, both respective former colonies. The United 
States became the largest single government donor responding to 
Ebola by appropriating USD 5.4 billion in emergency funding, the 
greatest amount of emergency funding ever provided by the US Con-
gress for an international health emergency.411 Almost all of this fund-
ing (USD 3.7 billion) was directed toward international activities, for 
both the initial response as well as ongoing recovery and rebuilding 
efforts.412 Yet when the Zika epidemic hit, a significant amount of US 
Ebola assistance was clawed back and repurposed for Zika.413 Accord-
ingly, reliance on individual state action alone is a risky method for 
preventing the spread of epidemics internationally. 
 The danger is that the harms from infectious diseases like Ebola 
may be perceived as localized and concentrated in the affected state(s). 
Undeniably, most of the containment efforts to date have stemmed 
from “Not in My Backyard” fears of contagion, and the actors most 
likely to intervene are those with interests that are not purely, or per-
haps not even primarily, humanitarian. Consequently, the perpetual 
challenge is how to incentivize states, international institutions, and 
other non-state actors to act, when it is not apparent that it is in their 
interests to do so. 
 Overall, the actors in the international peace and security re-
gime—from the UNSC, to the GA, to regional organizations and indi-
vidual states—responded in diverse ways to address structural vio-
lence from Ebola. It is too early to determine whether this indicates an 
emerging recognition by states that global public health inequities in 
the spread of epidemic diseases like Ebola can constitute a threat to 
international peace and security. Instead, there may be Ebola excep-
tionalism, since other diseases have not been afforded similar treat-
ment. The analysis above indicates that the regime’s historical failure 
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to recognize that the relationship between infectious diseases and con-
flict warrants more robust post-conflict reconstruction was the most 
substantial factor in contributing to structural violence during Ebola. 
This ex ante failure in the international peace and security regime was 
ultimately significant in influencing the trajectory of the epidemic. The 
regime’s ex post response to alleviate the harm caused by structural 
violence does not negate the impact of the initial harm.  
V. THEORETICAL & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 Because structural violence is viewed as quotidian, it is often not 
analyzed as amenable to legal reform. Yet structures are created by 
people, and as such structural violence can be prevented and amelio-
rated.414 Structural violence as a framework in this Article helps draw 
attention to the arrangement of and relationship between the parts or 
elements of complex legal regimes. Structural violence as an analytical 
frame in this Article assists with identifying actors, actions, laws, pol-
icies, and omissions that might otherwise be unacknowledged. In this 
way, the concept assists with apportioning partial responsibility. A ma-
jor implication of this Article is that a reexamination of the current 
framework for international responsibility is needed to adequately ad-
dress issues of structural violence witnessed with infectious disease. 
Additionally, this case study indicates that the complex relationship 
between infectious diseases and conflict warrants more robust atten-
tion and resources. Lastly, this Part finds that current advances in in-
ternational disaster law hold promise and need to be developed further, 
with an eye towards better addressing structural violence. This author 
plans to take up the potential for shared norms of international respon-
sibility and international disaster law to address issues raised by 
structural violence witnessed with epidemics in future research. 
A. The Limits of International Responsibility  
 The main implications of this study for the law of international 
responsibility are the need for responsibility to be allocated and the 
difficulty in apportioning blame for structural violence. Conventional 
understandings of international responsibility locate responsibility 
solely at the level of the state.415 This allows the activities of IOs and 
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other non-state actors, and the structural violence that results because 
of their functioning, to go un-scrutinized as seen with the analysis of 
highly infectious diseases like Ebola. The traditional view of state re-
sponsibility under Article 2 of the International Law Commission’s 
(ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts holds that states are only responsible for conduct at-
tributable to them through action or omission.416 The general rule is 
that conduct is attributable to the state under international law when 
it is committed by an organ of the government or when a person or 
entity is acting as an agent of the state and exercising elements of gov-
ernmental authority.417 However, a state can also be responsible to the 
extent it fails to take necessary measures to prevent harm, imposing a 
standard of due diligence.418 States generally resist principles of re-
sponsibility that would hold them responsible for conduct other than 
their own—whether those other actors are private, IOs, or other state 
actors.419 The way the ILC attempts to deal with situations where 
there are multiple state actors that are responsible for wrongdoing is 
unsatisfactory because it does not clarify how responsibility is to be 
allocated.420 Moreover, states are no longer the only relevant actor in 
the international order, and injuries are committed by individuals, cor-
porations, other non-state actors, and IOs, amongst others. 
Current legal reform efforts at expanding international responsi-
bility are inadequate. For example, the ILC has proposed making 
states responsible in certain situations where they delegate authority 
to an IO, which then violates rights.421 The proposal would hold states 
accountable even where the injury was solely attributable to the IO.422 
Yet to address many of the most pressing problems, individual states 
acting alone will be powerless to make any significant difference.423 
Recognizing this, the ILC has also proposed that an IO can be respon-
sible in connection with the wrongful acts of states where, for example, 
the organization adopts a decision that requires states to commit acts 
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that contravene international obligations.424   
IOs like the United Nations have been found to have international 
legal personality,425 which enables them to make claims and to have 
claims made against them. At the same time, IOs are layered organi-
zations that consist of member states. Notably, the Draft Articles on 
the Responsibility of International Organizations recognize that in sit-
uations of internationally wrongful acts where there is concerted action 
between IOs and states, both the states and the IOs have shared re-
sponsibility.426 The Draft Articles also provide for shared responsibil-
ity between IOs and other international organizations, although they 
do not clarify how these responsibilities are to be allocated amongst 
other actors.427 Yet increasingly IOs also have public-private partner-
ships and rely on private actors, especially in the field of global public 
health as witnessed with the Ebola epidemic. Furthermore, IOs and 
private actors like corporations may not necessarily be bound by inter-
national law obligations or even soft law in many areas, and if they are, 
their obligations may not be the same as states.  
This has created what one scholar has termed “responsibility 
gaps.”428 Such gaps can occur in many ways. One of the main chal-
lenges to conceptualizing international responsibility beyond the state 
is the multiplicity of actors at the international level that may or may 
not act in concert to produce a single injury; this can include govern-
ments acting individually or collectively, international and regional or-
ganizations, civil society, corporations, community-based actors, and 
individuals, amongst others. This occurs with instances of structural 
violence, where there is overdetermination because there are too many 
actors involved in the process that caused the harm. This may also lead 
to challenges in identifying which actor is responsible for what due to 
lack of information or knowledge about a given situation.429 Addition-
ally, a responsibility gap may persist because during instances of struc-
tural violence, where it is not necessarily obvious who should respond, 
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a bystander effect where no actor responds may result.430   
A responsibility gap may also occur because the individual actions 
of multiple actors may be distributed in a way that does not meet the 
requirements of international responsibility, which dictates that re-
sponsibility is only assigned to actors whose individual contributions 
are significant enough to pass the minimum threshold.431 In other ar-
eas of law, problems of overdetermination are dealt with by a number 
of doctrines—joint and several liability in tort law and joint criminal 
enterprise in international criminal law, by way of example.432 These 
principles have not been incorporated into the international law of re-
sponsibility, perhaps for good reasons.433 In part, this likely reflects 
the practical consideration that the higher the risks of responsibility, 
the more cautious actors will be in accepting international obligations. 
Yet, even if actors are willing to accept higher obligations, all interna-
tional dispute settlement mechanisms are premised on state consent, 
and most do not have jurisdiction over other IOs or corporations.434 
Thus, a responsibility gap will likely be maintained where a harm is 
the result of structural violence, because adjudication of a claim may 
not be able to proceed against the state if it withholds its consent to 
jurisdiction and in any event would not include the other international 
actors involved. This presents seemingly insurmountable challenges 
for attempting to provide full redress for structural violence witnessed 
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with Ebola through traditional principles of international responsibil-
ity. 
The law of international responsibility, like other areas of inter-
national law, is not neutral. It reflects the choices and practices of 
states and allows states and non-state actors to engage in blame-avoid-
ance and blame shifting for harmful consequences of structural vio-
lence and to shield themselves from responsibility.435 Due to the chal-
lenges discussed above, where structural violence results—like the 
avoidable deaths during the Ebola epidemic—injured parties will be 
without redress. This could occur either because the conditions for in-
ternational responsibility are not met or responsibility cannot be de-
termined, and it is also not possible to bring an effective claim against 
the collectivity as such.436 Yet one of the underlying principles of at-
tributing responsibility is that every legal injury deserves a remedy to 
ensure justice to victims.437   
 The dominant paradigm of international responsibility depends 
on an identifiable actor who acts to produce injury.438 However, when 
the actors are too numerous, and/or the injury is embedded in institu-
tions, the dominant paradigm is unable to provide redress and fails to 
capture the harms caused by structural violence. Thus, the increased 
rates of mortality and illness from infectious diseases like Ebola are 
generally unaccounted for. This makes it incredibly difficult to secure 
effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and redress for 
structural violence.439 The law of international responsibility privi-
leges the status quo and directs attention towards individual claims 
against specific actors for identifiable harms and away from legal re-
form efforts and concepts of shared international responsibility,440 es-
pecially in the field of global public health. Because of the limitations 
in utilizing traditional principles of responsibility, it is necessary to re-
conceptualize international responsibility. Accordingly, much more re-
search441 is needed on the potential for shared norms of international 
responsibility442 to better respond to structural violence, which this 
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author plans to do in future work. 
B. Complex Relationship between Infectious Diseases & Conflict 
Another implication of this study is the need to acknowledge and 
appropriately respond to the complex relationship between conflict and 
infectious diseases. The Ebola case study indicates that emphasizing 
the link between international peace and security and global public 
health might motivate countries in the Global North to comply with 
the IHRs obligations to assist other states with capacity-building of 
their domestic health sectors.443 This link seemingly galvanized state 
and non-state actor action during the outbreak and led to the formation 
of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) in 2014.444 The goal of 
the GHSA is to “advance a world safe and secure from infectious dis-
ease threats, to bring together nations from all over the world to make 
new, concrete commitments, and to elevate global health security as a 
priority.”445 Membership in the initiative is open to all countries and 
at the time of this writing nearly fifty nations are part of the GHSA, 
along with international organizations like the WHO as well as non-
governmental stakeholders.446 
The GHSA was created to facilitate collaborative, capacity-build-
ing efforts to achieve specific targets that are tied to the core capacities 
under the IHRs. While the IHRs require its 196 state parties to coop-
erate to help build health capacities,447 they do not articulate how this 
is to work in practice.448 The GHSA fills in this lacuna by creating a 
framework for countries to address their commitments. The GHSA has 
eleven Action Packages that are designed to help build state capacity 
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to prevent, detect, and respond to threats posed by infectious dis-
eases.449 Under the GHSA, member countries can utilize a tool that 
helps to assess baseline national health security capacity. An action 
plan can then be tailored with five-year targets for states to meet with 
a set of indicators to measure progress, as well as various activities to 
support successful implementation. One of the key aspects of the ex-
ternal evaluation tool is the ability to highlight gaps and needs for cur-
rent and prospective donors, as well as to inform and assist country-
level planning and priority setting.450 
Understandably, the countries most impacted by Ebola—Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Guinea—joined this initiative.451 For example, dur-
ing the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone in November of 2015, only 35 
percent of health facilities reported to their respective districts. By 
September 2016, with the help of the GHSA, this increased to 96 per-
cent of health facilities.452 Early indications similarly show the GHSA 
is having an impact in Liberia. Prior to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Libe-
ria had very few trained “disease detectives,” but with the support of 
the GHSA at the end of 2016 the country had a total of 115 trained 
“detectives” covering all fifteen counties and ninety-two health dis-
tricts.453 These initiatives will likely assist with early detection of ep-
idemic diseases.  
Additionally, there is evidence suggesting that investment in the 
promotion of protective and primary care services in the Global South 
leads to large improvements in public health, which generate benefits 
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for other states, like containment of epidemic diseases.454 Accordingly, 
under the GHSA, member countries can reach their commitments by 
building capacity nationally, regionally, or globally. For example, the 
United States made a commitment to assist thirty-one countries and 
the Caribbean Community to achieve eleven measurable GHSA tar-
gets.455 The United States has invested USD 1 billion in resources 
across seventeen of these countries that need the most assistance with 
capacity building to detect and respond to future infectious disease out-
breaks.456 The US rationale for participating in the GHSA is simple: 
the “most effective and least expensive way to protect Americans from 
diseases and other health threats that begin abroad is to stop them 
before they spread to our borders.”457 Additional donor countries and 
organizations have provided a collective commitment to assist seventy-
six countries to reach the capabilities described in the IHRs. The GHSA 
is based on the view that global health security is a “shared responsi-
bility” that cannot be achieved by a single actor or sector of govern-
ment.458 While neither it nor the IHRs determine how responsibility 
for capacity building should be allocated, 459 the GHSA is laudable as 
it is a proactive measure that does not ignore global health inequities 
in state capacities but instead tries to remedy them.  
Yet this initiative might sustain a problematic role between coun-
tries in the Global South and Global North, with the former being pri-
marily donor recipients and the latter generally consisting of donors. 
There is rich foreign aid literature that discusses the mismatch be-
tween donor and recipient countries’ priorities, with aid supplanting 
local needs.460 For instance, donor governments and NGOs often direct 
aid to specific health projects and diseases through vertical projects 
like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.461 This 
practice may undermine the development of a comprehensive public 
health system with the surveillance needed for proper disease preven-
tion. For instance, the proliferation of actors and fragmentation of 
health delivery prior to the Ebola epidemic meant that there was often 
a mismatch between national priorities for health development and 
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partner organizations’ funding stipulations. Accordingly, the less sexy 
task of building up the capacity of the state health sector horizontally 
and shoring up its ability to train, pay, and retain qualified health staff 
was not prioritized.462 Thus, there is a danger that this initiative 
might replicate structural violence.  
Additionally, this initiative runs the risk of securitizing health.463 
The move towards securitization means that epidemic diseases will re-
ceive more salience under this framework than non-infectious diseases 
due to the risk of transnational transmission. Yet non-communicable 
diseases may result in more structural violence than infectious dis-
eases. For example, common ailments like malaria kill far more people 
per year than Ebola.464 Further, sovereignty concerns and fears of pre-
textual and frequent interventions from powerful countries may limit 
the desire of states to formally expand the relationship between epi-
demic diseases and conflict. Indeed, treating an epidemic as a security 
problem could lead to the unhelpful militarization of epidemics and the 
sending of troops to address public health emergencies as opposed to 
medical personnel.465 While military and civilian humanitarian mis-
sions were utilized during the Ebola epidemic, it may be ill-conceived 
to consider security-oriented organizations to have any ability to un-
derstand the scope and nature of public health crises and to be able to 
effectively address them through coherent policies as a regular mat-
ter.466 Although the merits of securitizing issues of health potentially 
draw additional resources, doing so could lead to inadvertent conse-
quences and can have ramifications of allowing for extraordinary re-
sponses typical to how issues of direct violence are addressed,467 which 
may be inappropriate for dealing with structural violence. In sum, 
there is a need to acknowledge the relationship between infectious dis-
eases and conflict. Yet due to the risk of inappropriate responses, the 
reification of the relationship between conflict and infectious diseases 
must be approached with trepidation so as not to further structural 
violence.  
C. International Disaster Law & Responding to Epidemics 
 Finally, this Article finds that much more is needed than reform 
                                                                                                                       
462 Leach, supra note 8, at 823. 
463 See BARRY BUZAN ET AL., SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 18 (1998) 
(discussing the issues surrounding the process of securitization).  
464 Hood, supra note 336, at 46. 
465 See Agnew, supra note 15, at 124–25. 
466 See David, supra note 342, at 578. 
467 See Thomas, supra note 34, at 1830. 
 
77       VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 51:245 
in each of the discrete regimes analyzed. Instead, reexamination of the 
current framework for responding to crises is needed to adequately ad-
dress issues of structural violence. International disaster law is a 
framework for responding to complex international emergencies that 
spans different regimes and may have utility for addressing issues of 
structural violence witnessed with the Ebola epidemic. This subpart 
analyzes the current efforts to address nested domestic and interna-
tional law failures through non-binding aspirational international 
law468 to reduce disasters.  
 In 2015, states passed a non-binding resolution to reduce the risk 
of disasters under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030.469 The goal of the initiative over the next fifteen years is to 
reduce “disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in 
the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of 
persons, businesses, communities and countries.”470 The third priority 
area of focus is private investment in disaster risk prevention and re-
duction through structural and non-structural measures to enhance 
the economic, social, health, and cultural resilience of persons, commu-
nities, countries, and their assets, as well as the environment.471 The 
Framework recognizes that states have the primary role to reduce dis-
aster risk but that responsibility should be shared with other stake-
holders.472 Under the Framework, disaster risk reduction is a common 
concern for all states and calls for sustainable international coopera-
tion towards enhancing the capabilities of countries in the Global 
South.473 The Framework is not simply reactionary to structural vio-
lence, but seeks to stimulate efforts to build better core public health 
capabilities for disease surveillance and health systems strengthening. 
However, many countries in the Global North have generally failed to 
comply with the IHRs’ obligations to assist other states with capacity-
building of their domestic health sectors.474 The Sendai Framework’s 
endorsement by the UNGA475 potentially indicates a willingness for 
further international cooperation through capacity building for better 
prevention, detection, and treatment of epidemics.   
                                                                                                                       
468 Also known as soft law, which seeks to be recognized by states as hard law and to 
influence state practice. 
469 See generally Third U.N. World Conference, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015–2030, U.N. Doc. A./RES./69./283 (June 23, 2015) [hereinafter Sendai 
Framework]. 
470 Id. ¶ 16. 
471 Id. ¶ 29. 
472 Id. ¶ 19.  
473 Id. 
474 See Gostin, supra note 317. 
475 Sendai Framework, supra note 469. 
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 More recently, the ILC adopted the Draft Articles on The Protec-
tion of Persons in the Event of Disasters.476 The Draft Articles are 
complementary to the Sendai Framework and propose that states “re-
duce the risk of disasters by taking appropriate measures, including 
through legislation and regulations, to prevent, mitigate, and prepare 
for disasters.”477 This provision potentially protects against the risk 
that this framework will only apply once an epidemic has emerged. 
Presumably, the more detailed Sendai Framework will help to clarify 
the measures states should adopt to meet this duty as well as their 
obligations under the IHRs to cooperate to help build health capaci-
ties.478 Moreover, the disaster risk reduction framework may be of rel-
evance to post-conflict reconstruction given the lower levels of institu-
tional resiliency.  
 The Draft Articles define disaster as “a calamitous event or series 
of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering 
and distress, mass displacement, or large-scale material or environ-
mental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of soci-
ety.”479 This definition would likely prioritize situations where struc-
tural violence results in extreme threats to human security as the 
result of pandemic diseases. For instance, the framework could be trig-
gered if the epidemic has reached a point of “disaster,” based on an 
assessment of: the scope of the structural violence, the severity of the 
suffering and human rights violations, the causes of structural vio-
lence, the states’ (and other actors’) relation to this structural violence, 
and the existence of feasible solutions. However, the emphasis on 
“event,” as opposed to the consequences of events, may limit the ability 
of the Draft Articles to be responsive to structural violence witnessed 
with infectious diseases. Yet the language of “series of events” may al-
low enough malleability to apply to slower forming pandemics. Nota-
bly, the Articles do not limit the definition of disaster to natural or hu-
man-made events, which means that it could apply to issues of 
structural violence witnessed with epidemics.  
 Under the Draft Articles, the affected state has a duty to ensure 
protection to persons and the provision of disaster relief in its territory, 
but where a disaster manifestly exceeds its capacities, the affected 
                                                                                                                       
476 See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eight Session, Draft 
Articles on The Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, U.N. Doc. A/71/10 (2016) 
[hereinafter Int’l Law Comm’n, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters]. 
477 Id. art. 9. 
478 See Gostin & Friedman, supra note 261, at 1323. 
479 Int’l Law Comm’n, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra note 476, 
art. 3.  
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state has a duty to seek assistance from other states, the United Na-
tions, and others.480 However, the Draft Articles are careful not to un-
dermine sovereignty concerns, providing that affected states have the 
“primary role in the direction, control, and supervision of assis-
tance.”481 Moreover, the Draft Articles require that the affected state 
consents to the provision of external assistance but that such consent 
shall not be withheld arbitrarily.482 The Draft Articles are compatible 
with the global public health regime. For example, the WHO is simi-
larly limited by the sovereignty of its member states and cannot act to 
assist a state in responding to an infectious disease unless the state 
invites the WHO in to provide assistance.483 The principle of non-in-
terference is reflected in the statement of Director-General Chan dur-
ing the Ebola epidemic that affected nations have “first priority to take 
care of their people.”484 Yet affected states were not able to effectively 
implement the WHO’s recommendations of treatment centers, ade-
quate compensation for health workers, and personal protective equip-
ment due to capacity constraints.485 And no effective governance struc-
tures existed internationally to fill the gap between the law in the 
abstract and the contextual reality of these health deficits.486 The dis-
aster risk reduction framework presents a possible avenue.   
 The Draft Articles provide for a duty for states to cooperate 
amongst themselves, with the United Nations, and with other ac-
tors.487 Yet arguably the U.N. Charter already compels member states 
to provide international assistance and cooperation.488 Under Article 
56 of the Charter, member states are “to take joint and separate action 
in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the pur-
poses set forth in Article 55.”489 And Article 55 provides that the 
United Nations shall promote “solutions of international economic, so-
cial, health, and related problems and international cultural and edu-
cational cooperation.”490 Article 55 also provides in relevant part that 
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the United Nations should promote higher standards of living and con-
ditions of economic and social progress and development as well as uni-
versal respect for and observance of human rights.491 Reading these 
provisions together presumably provides a basis to argue that states 
are obligated under the Charter to cooperate with the United Nations 
and other actors to prevent, detect, and arrest pandemics.492 An obli-
gation to cooperate can also be located under international human 
rights law. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) has emphasized that “[s]tates parties should recognize the 
essential role of international cooperation and comply with their com-
mitment to take joint and separate action to achieve the full realization 
of the right to health.”493  
 Significantly, the Draft Articles do not establish a duty to provide 
assistance.494 Instead, the Draft Articles include a procedural element 
of proper evaluation of requests for assistance.495 However, per the 
CESCR, states have an obligation subject to the availability of re-
sources to “facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and ser-
vices in other countries, wherever possible, and [to] provide the neces-
sary aid when required.”496 Additionally, the Committee has found 
that states have a “joint and individual responsibility,” under interna-
tional law, “to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance in times of emergency.”497 As such, states are to contribute 
to this task, giving priority in the provision of international medical 
aid, distribution, and management of resources and financial aid to the 
“most vulnerable or marginalized groups of the population.”498 The 
Committee also stressed that given that some diseases are “easily 
transmissible beyond the frontiers of a State, the international com-
munity has a collective responsibility to address this problem.”499 
                                                                                                                       
491 Id. art. 55(a), 55(c). 
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Moreover, the CESCR underscored that state parties to the Covenant 
in the Global North have a special responsibility and an interest to as-
sist poorer states in the Global South with epidemic diseases.500  
 However, a more expansive notion of responsibility at the interna-
tional level may lead to calls for the adoption of international Good 
Samaritan laws.501 While domestically some states offer immunity to 
Good Samaritans, sometimes statutes are framed in a way that allows 
for claims of negligent care, and/or exempt from immunity parties that 
act in an intentional or reckless manner in rendering aid. Moreover, 
Good Samaritan laws are usually inapplicable to actors that provide 
emergency assistance due to obligation (e.g. during the course of their 
regular employment). Accordingly, increasing international responsi-
bility for structural violence witnessed with infectious diseases may 
create perverse disincentives for actors to voluntarily render assis-
tance or consent to more robust international responsibility norms. In-
deed, how to bridge the gap between law, policy, and reality interna-
tionally regarding global health inequities is a fundamental challenge. 
This author plans to investigate in future works how the disaster risk 
reduction framework can be developed and applied to effectively re-
spond to structural violence witnessed with epidemics. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 This Article maintains that the international community’s current 
approach to addressing infectious diseases like Ebola, as public health 
crises susceptible to individual country medical interventions, is prob-
lematic because it obscures the focus from changing the social, legal, 
and physical environments that help to produce these epidemics. This 
Article demonstrates that effectively tackling the disproportionate dis-
tribution of infectious diseases within countries in the Global South is 
a fundamental challenge for international law and international rela-
tions.502   
Further, this Article argues that the way international crises are 
conceptualized needs to be expanded beyond merely addressing direct 
physical violence internationally. Instead, this project sustains that in-
ternational responses must also include remedying structural violence. 
Structural violence involves multiple harms and injuries, which often 
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501 A Good Samaritan refers to someone who renders aid in an emergency to an injured 
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result from numerous actors and institutions. Unlike traditional con-
ceptions of violence, structural violence is unique and is characterized 
by delayed effects in which both the causes and the casualties are dis-
counted and unremembered. This is especially evident in the distribu-
tion of highly infectious diseases. Structural violence as an analytical 
frame in this Article assists with identifying actors, actions, laws, pol-
icies, omissions, and partial and cumulative responsibility that might 
otherwise be unacknowledged. This Article provides a useful frame-
work for how the concept of structural violence can be operationalized 
in law. 
The concept of structural violence assists with apportioning par-
tial responsibility. Accordingly, a key finding of this Article is that fig-
uring out how international actors should account for structural vio-
lence is not at all straightforward. Traditional principles of 
international law perpetuate the fallacy that states can on their own 
cope with the problems created by globalization, including the in-
creased incidence of infectious diseases like Ebola. Yet states are not 
self-sufficient, and this Article shows that the distribution of infectious 
diseases like Ebola is fundamentally conditioned in part by transna-
tional actors and global institutions. As such, responsibility for ad-
dressing this structural violence must be shared across a wide range of 
actors.503   
This Article concludes that reconceptualizing international re-
sponsibility would require a much more forward-looking approach than 
conventional approaches to responsibility. This shared approach to re-
sponsibility would encapsulate prospective obligations to aid or provide 
humanitarian and disaster relief. As such, this Article also finds that 
it is necessary to develop the emerging disaster risk reduction frame-
work in international law to adequately address issues of structural 
violence witnessed with infectious disease like Ebola.  
An expanded conceptualization of responsibility would mean that 
states, IOs, and other non-state actors would have a moral and un-
doubtedly contested legal duty to recognize and act upon the threats 
posed by structural violence. Past practices that led to structural vio-
lence impose an obligation to mitigate or remedy the harm caused.504 
This duty as applied to infectious diseases like Ebola would be based 
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on not only principles of global justice,505 but also legal obligations of 
international cooperation and duties under international human rights 
law. In addition, this obligation would be rooted in naked self-interest 
because highly infectious diseases do not respect borders. Ultimately, 
states are self-interested and do not want to see their “own people” die 
of Ebola or some other infectious disease. 
In the end, it may be that state and non-state action is galvanized 
to fight pandemics not because of a recognition of the structural vio-
lence caused, nor necessarily because of humanitarian impulses or 
transnational solidarity, nor even because an actor accepts that it has 
violated an international duty. Instead, it may be that state and non-
state action is motivated out of a shared self-interest. Accordingly, it is 
worth considering what possibilities exist for harnessing this shared 
self-interest to expand principles of international responsibility in a 
manner that reduces disasters and better addresses structural violence 
posed by infectious diseases. In sum, it is vital to reduce the responsi-
bility and accountability gaps in international law, because ultimately 
“we must assume responsibility for the unintended and invisible con-
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